

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



*An American Quarterly  
Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

OCTOBER  
1958

*Vol. 17, No. 4*

*Price \$1.25*

## Contributors To This Issue

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, foreign correspondent in Soviet Russia for the *Christian Science Monitor*, 1922-1933, is the author of well-known works on the Soviet Union and international affairs.

ALEXANDRA TOLSTOY, youngest daughter of Count Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), is the author of *Tolstoy—A Life of My Father*, 1953, and other works. Since 1939 she has headed the Tolstoy Foundation in New York which provides moral and material assistance to Russian refugees.

FEDOR STEPUN, Russian philosopher and writer, has been lecturing and writing in Western Germany since the Revolution; one of his books, *The Russian Soul and Revolution*, was translated into English and published by Scribners' Sons in 1935.

WILLIAM K. MEDLIN is a student of Russian political and cultural history and institutions and author of *Moscow and East Rome*, 1952; he has been Lecturer in Political Science at the American University, Washington, D. C.

SERGE ZENKOVSKY has written extensively on the Russian Church Schism and national minority groups within the U.S.S.R.; he is at present Assistant Professor of History and head of the Russian and Asian area program at Stetson University, Florida.

EUGENE M. KAYDEN is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of the South; born in Russia and educated in the United States, he has published translations of Russian poets and is at present preparing a volume of translations of Pasternak's poetry.

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

*An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

Vol. 17

October, 1958

No. 4

• • •

The Jacobin Ancestry of Soviet Communism, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i> .....	251
Tolstoy and Music, <i>Alexandra Tolstoy</i> .....	258
The Russian Intelligentsia and Bolshevism, <i>Fedor Stepun</i> .....	263
Khrushchev: A Political Profile I, <i>William K. Medlin</i> .....	278
A Russian Historian at Harvard, <i>Serge A. Zenkovsky</i> .....	292
Seven Poems by Boris Pasternak, translated by <i>Eugene M. Kayden</i> .....	301

## BOOK REVIEWS

Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland, <i>by Victor Leontovitsch</i> ; Russian Liberalism, <i>by George Fischer, Marc Raeff</i> .....	307
The Soviet Secret Police, <i>ed. by Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser, Robert Paul Browder</i> .....	310
Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution, <i>by Thomas Taylor Hammond, D. Novak</i> .....	311
Die Arbeitsverfassung der Sowjetunion, <i>by Werner Hofmann, Oswald P. Backus, III</i> .....	313

*Continued on Page II*

Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War, <i>by</i> David T. Cattell, <i>Murray Polner</i> .....	314
Child of the Revolution, <i>by</i> Leonhard Wolfgang, <i>Gabriel Gersh</i> .....	316
The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, <i>by</i> Nicolas Spulber, <i>Alexander D. Bilimovich</i> .....	316
Gogol, <i>by</i> David Magarshack, <i>Jack A. Posin</i> .....	318
Dostoyevski in Russian Literary Criticism, <i>by</i> Vladimir Seduro, <i>Herbert E. Bowman</i> .....	320
Das religionsphilosophische System Vladimir Solovjevs, <i>by</i> Ludolf Müller, <i>Emanuel Sarkisyanz</i> .....	321
Index to Volume 17 .....	322

## THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt

*Editor*

William Henry Chamberlin  
Ralph T. Fisher, Jr.

Michael Karpovich  
Warren B. Walsh

Alexis Wiren

---

The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

---



---

Copyright 1958 by the Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover N. H. Published quarterly in January, April, July and October. Entered as second class matter at the post office in Hanover, N. H., under the Act of March 3, 1897. Additional entry at the post office in Deep River, Conn. Subscription rates: \$5.00 a year in the United States; Canada \$5.50; foreign \$6.00; single issues through Vol. 12, \$1.00; subsequent single issues \$1.25. Cumulative Index to Vols. I-X (Nov. 1941, Oct. 1951), \$.75 per copy. The contents of this publication cannot be reprinted without permission of the editors. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.



# The Jacobin Ancestry of Soviet Communism

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

A BIT of ideological genealogy which has received insufficient attention is the close kinship between the Jacobins, who dominated France from the spring of 1793 until the downfall of Robespierre in July, 1794, and the Russian Bolsheviki, or Communists. This is only the most salient and perhaps the most important of many parallels between the French and Russian revolutions.

The many similarities between these two vast upheavals could be the theme of a long historical essay. The way for both revolutions was prepared by a ferment among the intellectuals, many of whom were ironically, perhaps justly, swept away by the torrent which they helped to unloose and then were unable to control, like the Sorcerer's Apprentice of Goethe's poem.

France in 1789, and Russia in the spring of 1917 experienced an early "honeymoon" period, when people were embracing each other and hailing the dawn of a new day. The French nobles divested themselves of their privileges; the Russian Provisional Government rapidly swept away, with successive strokes of the pen, all the repressive and discriminatory legislation on the statute books of the Russian Empire.

But the honeymoon did not last long; the Bolsheviki, with their agitation, were quick to stir up all the latent class hatred for the *boorzhui*, to set the poor and ignorant majority of the population, the soldiers, the industrial workers, the peasants, against the well-to-do educated minority. The same prevailed in France; there was no lack of revolutionary "patriots" to direct the hatred of the masses against the "aristocrats" and "counter-revolutionaries."

Growing hunger and financial and economic chaos greatly strengthened the spirit of class war in both countries. The more

moderate revolutionary groups in France, of which the Girondists were the strongest, were the equivalent of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia and in the fierce ordeal of civil war these moderates were ground to pieces, rejected and persecuted by the extremists on both sides.

The internal course of revolutionary struggle was complicated by foreign war and intervention; and this served as an excuse and psychological stimulus to extreme terrorism. The Committees of Public Safety and Public Welfare in France, the Cheka in Russia, worked day and night breaking up real or imaginary plots, seizing and executing suspects in larger and larger batches.

The Cossack areas of southeastern Russia, the valleys of the Don and Kuban, were the fighting center of resistance to the revolutionary innovations and thereby resembled La Vendée, the area of western and northwestern France where the majority of the people, out of considerations of religion and loyalty to feudal lords and the monarchy, fought against the armies of the Revolution.

The Jacobins in France, like the Communists in Russia, were the organizers of victory; their fierce energy and fanatical devotion tipped the scales of a bitter and bloody struggle. Lenin, Trotsky, and other leaders of the Communists were fully conscious of their position as heirs of the Jacobins in the French Revolution; they even imitated Jacobin gestures, such as successively expelling opposition parties from the Soviets and branding their members as "enemies of the people."

In short the whole sanguinary drama of the Russian Revolution and civil war was played out in advance in France, with the difference that in France there was more articulate eloquence. The victims of the guillotine, chief weapon of extermination in France, had one advantage that was denied to the larger number of martyrs of the Russian Revolution who were shot in the cellars of the Cheka. They were, in most cases, executed publicly and were able to pronounce last messages. There is no record of a Russian Mme. Roland crying: "Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name."

The members of the Russian Imperial family were simply

massacred in gangster fashion, without any theatrical trappings of trial and judgment. And there is no legend about the slaughter in the Ipatiev House, where the Tsar, the Tsarina and their children were mowed down, comparable with the story that a priest greeted Louis XVI, at the time of his execution, with the words:

"Son of St. Louis, ascend into Heaven."

There was also a substantial difference in the duration of the dictatorships. The Jacobins were in power for a little over a year, from the time when, with the aid of the Paris mob, they expelled their principal rivals, the Girondists, from the Convention and executed many of them, to the overthrow of Robespierre and the elimination of the hardcore Jacobin leadership in July, 1794.

The Soviet regime last year celebrated the fortieth anniversary of its establishment. During this period there have been many violent purges and shifts of power within the leadership of the ruling Communist Party. But the Party, as an apparatus of control, has remained. Certain basic principles of government have not changed: the exclusion of opposition parties, the state monopoly of basic economic enterprise and also of all means of instruction, information and entertainment, press, radio, schools, publishing houses, theatres, etc.

The strongest and most obvious link between French Jacobins and Soviet Communists is a common philosophy of utopian perfectionism, very similar to what may be found in certain fanatical religious creeds. Both Robespierre and Lenin, on different theoretical grounds, were convinced that the means existed to bring mankind to unheard of heights of happiness and well-being.

Robespierre's thinking was shaped mainly by Rousseau and to some extent by less well-known apostles of the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, Helvetius and Holbach, Mably and Morelly. These men believed that human nature is essentially good, that poverty, inequality and vice are the results of ignorance and bad institutions, that if only educators and legislators are wise enough they can mold virtuous men who will, in turn, create a social order without any of the

blemishes associated with monarchy, feudalism and the "old regime" in general. To quote the author who has made the most searching and penetrating survey of the ideology of French Jacobinism:<sup>1</sup>

Helvetius, Holbach, Mably, the Physiocrats and others, in the same way as Rousseau himself, believed that ultimately man was nothing but the product of the laws of the State, and that there was nothing a government was incapable of doing in the art of forming man . . . Rousseau's adored Legislator is nothing but the great Educator . . .

It is the task of the Legislator to bring about social harmony, that is to say, reconcile the personal good with the general good. It is for the Legislator, as Helvetius put it, to discover means of placing men under the necessity of being virtuous. This can be achieved with the help of institutions, laws, education and a proper system of rewards and punishments . . .

Helvetius and Holbach taught that the temporal interest alone, if handled cleverly, was sufficient to form virtuous men. Good laws alone make virtuous men. This being so, vice in society is not the outcome of the corruption of human nature, but the fault of the Legislator.

Lenin's prescription for human salvation was simpler, narrower and more specific. It was the violent overthrow of the existing political, economic and social order throughout the world and the establishment, through the "dictatorship of the proletariat," of a Communist system in accordance with the teachings of Karl Marx. Lenin reduced every moral issue to the simple question: does it, or does it not, promote this end?

Lenin never attempted to give a very detailed or elaborate picture of what life under Communism would be like, what new problems it would raise. He merely assumed, on the basis of his unquestioning faith in Marx, that the achievement of this worldwide revolution would usher in an era of unprecedented wellbeing, in which all injustices and tensions would be swept away and humanity, free from the evils of war and "capitalist oppression" would march to new heights of progress.

To dream of an ideal social order, to work out blueprints for such an order, along the lines of Thomas More's *Utopia* or Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* is harmless, perhaps beneficial. But when revolutionary leaders who have acquired

<sup>1</sup>Cf. J. L. Talmon, *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*, pp. 31-33.

absolute power over the lives of their countrymen try to put such dreams into practice the consequences are likely to be extremely formidable, and very different from what the soft-hearted humanitarians who conceived the original dream expected.

For it is a very short step from the belief that a perfect social order is possible to the conviction that bad people must be responsible for its nonrealization. And it is an equally short step to the conviction that the punishment and even "liquidation" of these bad people is a very small and negligible price to pay for the Utopia that is just around the corner. The fanatical perfectionist is always ready to succumb to the fallacy that the end justifies the means.

Among many points of similarity between French Jacobins of the late eighteenth century and Russian, Chinese and other Communists in the twentieth the following are perhaps most significant: fanatical faith in the saving grace of revolution; arbitrary identification of the will and interest of a single party with the will and interest of the entire people; belief that a new type of man can be molded by state indoctrination. In his use of the word democracy Lenin could understand Robespierre and Robespierre could have understood Lenin; whereas both are incomprehensible to one who thinks in the Western tradition of limited government and ordered liberty.

Lenin spoke of "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" and a Marxist phrase, "the dictatorship of the proletariat," has been a key slogan of Communist rule everywhere, and is identified with a higher form of democracy in Communist propaganda. With the same cast of thought Robespierre proclaimed: "The Government of the Revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny."

"Democratic dictatorship," "despotism of liberty." To most people in countries where free institutions prevail these phrases would seem self-contradictory, if not downright incomprehensible. But they are full of meaning to revolutionary leaders.

In the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat Lenin set up a political police more cruel in its methods and far more extensive in its operations than the *Okrana* of the Tsars. In the



name of the "despotism of liberty" Robespierre carried out a slaughter of real or imagined counter-revolutionaries (including many of the most prominent figures in the first phase of the movement) for which there is no parallel in the annals of the absolute Bourbon rulers.

The words of Burke, the great British political theorist, whose *Reflections on the Revolution in France* remains a masterpiece of argument against doctrinaire utopianism, were proved right twice, in France and in Russia. Writing before France had entered the phase of extreme terrorism, Burke said, of the ideologies of the French Revolution:

"In the groves of their academy, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows."

Burke's reputation for a time was under a cloud (he is now experiencing a rehabilitation) because of a rather lazy intellectual impression that the French Revolution, after all, worked out for the best. This made it easy to cast Burke in the role of a reactionary, excessively preoccupied with the trappings and pageantry of a monarchy and an aristocracy that were doomed to perish. But this overlooks the very real threat which Jacobin philosophy and methods of organization and propaganda posed to ordered liberty, not only in France, but in Europe. To quote Talmon again:<sup>2</sup>

Inside the (Jacobin) clubs there was going on an unceasing process of self-cleansing and purification, entailing denunciations, confessions, excommunications and expulsions. The dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety was thus no mere tyranny of a handful of men clinging to power and in possession of all the means of coercion, no mere police system in a beleaguered fortress. It rested on closely knit and highly disciplined cells and nuclei in every town and village, from the central artery of Paris to the smallest hamlet in the mountains.

It is not only in internal organization that an amazing similarity may be found between French and Russian revolutionary institutions. William Pitt the Younger, in a speech with a strangely modern ring which he delivered before the House of Commons on February 1, 1793, brought this indictment against the "indirect aggression" of the French revolutionary regime:

<sup>2</sup>Talmon, *op cit.*, p. 127.



Under the name of liberty they have resolved to make every country, in substance if not in form, a province dependent on themselves, through the despotism of Jacobin societies. This has given a more fatal blow to the liberties of mankind than any they have suffered, even from the boldest attempt of the most aspiring monarch . . . Unless she is stopped in her career, all Europe must soon learn their ideas of justice — law of nations — models of government — and principles of liberty from the mouth of the French cannon.

The French got rid of Robespierre before he had killed more than a small fraction of the number of people who perished at the hands of Lenin and Stalin. But Jacobinism, the belief in the moral right of a revolutionary élite to impose its will, as that of the people, did not perish with its authors. As Professor M. M. Karpovich has shown, it influenced very much the Russian revolutionary thinker Tkachev, who, in turn, probably influenced Lenin. Jacobinism experienced a rebirth in many of the ideas and methods of Soviet Communism. And in France itself the Jacobin tradition has helped to induce "advanced" workers and intellectuals to accept the similar doctrine of Communism.

# Tolstoy and Music

By ALEXANDRA TOLSTOY

MUSIC had an enormous influence on Tolstoy. What he experienced was far more complex than mere enjoyment. Music penetrated the deepest recesses of his soul, it stirred his whole being, it released in him embryonic thoughts and emotions of which he himself was not cognizant. Waves of delight, joy, fear of losing these seconds of almost divine uplift, flooded him, suffocated him. He felt like crying and laughing at once and was filled with the strongest urge to create.

I remember how sometimes, after listening to some of his favorite composers, Chopin, Mozart, Haydn, Bach, Schubert, played by his friends, who were great Russian musicians, he would leave his favorite grandfather's armchair (which we called the Voltaire armchair), and would go to his study. I do not doubt that he wrote down thoughts that were inspired by this music.

"What is it?" he would say, "Why is it that a certain combination of sounds impresses you so much, stirs your emotions, sometimes brings out the best spiritual forces concealed in your soul? I can't explain it!"

In music, as in his life, in art and literature, Tolstoy could not stand anything artificial or false. "Art is not art if it is invented. It must be natural and sincere," he wrote in his *What is Art?*

And further on he goes even deeper into his understanding of art. "The aim of art," he writes, "is to express the highest feelings which are the result of our religious conception."

"And what has become of art and music?" Tolstoy continues, "It is devoted to excite, stimulate all kinds of sexual feelings. Think of all the filthy operas, operettas, songs, romances, which

are thriving in our world and involuntarily you come to the conclusion that contemporary art has one definite aim—spreading corruption as widely as possible.”

Father had the opportunity of hearing the best musicians of his time. In 1875 Nikolai Rubinstein arranged a special evening of music for him. Among other numbers, a Chaikovsky quartet was played. The reaction of father to this performance has been recorded by Chaikovsky in his diary: “It may be that never in my life,” he writes, “have I as a composer, been as flattered and touched as I was then when Lev Tolstoy, sitting beside me and listening to the Andante in my quartet, burst into a flood of tears.”

Theodor Schaliapin came to our home in Moscow at the very beginning of his brilliant career. And strange to say, while everyone (the members of our family and all of the guests) was enchanted and did not have enough words to express their enthusiasm, my father was reserved in his praises, and one could see, that the singing of Schaliapin did not have the usual effect which music had on him.

Perhaps the reason was that Schaliapin mostly sang the music of Moussorgsky, which my father never liked as he considered it to be artificial and false. He never liked Moussorgsky's operas nor his children's “In the Nursery,” which were sung to him by a well-known Russian singer, Olenina-D'Alheim.

“Do you sing folk songs?” father asked Schaliapin. In reply Schaliapin sang an old Russian song, “The Night.” “Wonderful! Splendid!” father exclaimed, when Schaliapin finished and one could see that he was greatly impressed.

I never could understand my father's negative opinion of Beethoven, especially his late compositions. In his *What is Art?*, he speaks about the mistakes of the musical critics, who give incorrect, perverted opinion on music but who are instrumental in forming public opinion. Tolstoy says, “Among the numerous works of Beethoven, written in haste to order and in spite of their artificial forms, there are a few compositions of art, but as Beethoven grows deaf and cannot hear, he starts writing artificial, unaccomplished and therefore often absurd and in the

musical sense, non-understandable compositions, but the critics praised Beethoven's last works and public opinion was formed."

Sometimes well-known pianists—the composer Taneef, Professors Goldenweiser, and Igumnoff—would play Beethoven sonatas. They left Tolstoy cold and sometimes made him sad. There were only a few exceptions; he liked the Sonata Pathétique, the Moonlight Sonata and the first part of the Kreutzer Sonata, which inspired his novel bearing the same title.

Father never understood or liked the music of Wagner, whose compositions he considered false, coarse, and without any inward meaning. He also did not understand Brahms, Richard Strauss, and the Russian composer Scriabin.

Serge Rachmaninoff met my father when he was a young man and had just started his career. At that time the composer wrote his poem, "Fate," which father did not like. I do not know if father expressed his opinion of the work, but I do know that he advised Rachmaninoff to compose music only when he had real feelings to express, at the requirement of his heart and soul. At that time Rachmaninoff did not share father's ideas on music, perhaps he understood them later, when he created his wonderful concertos, preludes, and songs.

Among the numerous musicians who came to our house was the well-known conductor of the Boston symphony orchestra, Serge Koussevitsky. At that time he played the basso in a French quartet of ancient music.

During the last years of father's life, Wanda Landowska was a frequent visitor at Yasnaya Poliana. She always brought her harpsichord with her. Father enjoyed her playing immensely not only because of her performance, which was perfect, but also because she played my father's favorite compositions of Rameau, Bach, Mozart, and Haydn.

Our entire family was musical — Aunt Mary (father's sister, who later became a nun), was a good pianist. Father played the piano and even studied the theory of music when he was young, hoping to become a composer. My eldest brother Serge was a good pianist and a composer of music. My mother's sister, Aunt Tania — (the prototype of Natasha Rostova in *War and Peace*)

had a beautiful voice. For entire evenings she would sing songs by Chaikovsky, Glinka, Dargomishsky. My father would accompany her on the piano. It was about her that the famous Russian poet Fet wrote his beautiful poem describing an evening when Aunt Tania sang till dawn, filling the hearts of her listeners with emotion.

There was always music in our house. In the evening someone would play the piano or the violin or sometimes we would form a choir and all sing together with the accompaniment of the guitar. Father always took part and enjoyed these musical parties.

Father liked the Russian folk songs. In the summer time on Sundays or sometimes during the haymaking season which was considered to be something like a holiday, the peasants would sing songs till late late at night. The village was situated on the other side of the lake and the voices were distinctly heard floating in the stillness of the quiet summer night. "So much sincerity, happiness, and joy are expressed in those simple songs," father would say, "They make you feel happy too."

When we lived in Moscow we used to go to the Maiden Lane Fair, which was quite close to our house. The Fair usually lasted one week during Easter. All kinds of toys and pottery made by the peasant craftsmen were sold and bright colored balloons floated over the big crowds. One could see Punch and Judy, ride the "Russian Mountains" or the carousels. It was lots of fun.

But what attracted Tolstoy to the Fair? It was the music! There was a group of pipers who played from a balcony while people crowded below to listen to them. They were peasants from one of the northern provinces of Russia. The pipes they played were made by themselves. Those men never studied music; they knew no theory, no harmony; they played old Russian songs by ear in several parts. And these songs expressed such a depth of feeling, of sadness and joy! The songs were composed through the centuries, passed on from father to son, as was the art of making the pipes they were playing. "All folk art will educate and unite men, will make them understand

the joy of unity outside the barriers raised by life," he wrote on the last page of *What is Art?* And there was Tolstoy jammed in the crowd, in the dust and heat, listening! To him the performance of those illiterate, but talented peasant musicians, was real art!



# The Russian Intelligentsia and Bolshevism\*

By FEDOR STEPUN

THE Communist party of the Bolsheviks was born in London in 1903 at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party. What is often forgotten is that the Bolsheviks did not triumph over the monarchy, but over the Provisional Government of the socialist Kerensky, in which many representatives of the social democracy inclining toward the western view, participated. Nevertheless, Lenin and his adherents interpreted their victory as a definite triumph of the orthodox Marxists over the Russian bourgeoisie and celebrated it as such. Unfortunately, many accepted this claim which led to far-reaching distortion of research on the Russian Revolution.

In the following, an attempt will be made to show the untenability of the Marxist assertion and to oppose to it a different interpretation which is supported by a number of philosophers of history and sociologists, notably, by the European investigator, Jules Monnerot, in his well-known book *Sociology of Communism*.

It is clear that the Marxist explanation of the Bolshevik Revolution is tenable only if one assumes that Russia, at the turn of the century, was in the throes of a class struggle. Many of the leading socialists believed this to be the case, but it was, in fact, far from the truth. For one thing, they advocated these views not as historians or sociologists, but as revolutionaries who did not hesitate to distort the truth in order to change the world.

That the industrialization of Russia had a tremendous upsurge

\*This article is a translation from the German of the author's lecture given at the Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, in the summer of 1956. [Ed.]

in the last decade of the past century, will not be doubted by anyone. That has been demonstrated conclusively. It is merely a question whether the industrialization of the country on a capitalist basis had to lead inevitably to the formation of classes and class struggle, and whether the latter had actually been kindled in Russia. In this connection it is interesting to remember, that in the camp of the Narodniki, the populist anti-Marxist socialists of the eighteen-nineties, the possibility had been considered of "transplanting" capitalism to Russia without, however, adopting the capitalist class structure.

In 1897, in his well-known work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Lenin regretted that 80 to 90 percent of the population of Russia were peasants. When one considered that the residual 20 to 10 percent must include the nobility, the clergy, the businessmen, and all the representatives of the free professions one can scarcely ignore the fact that seven years before the outbreak of the revolution of 1905, Russia must have been a land almost entirely devoid of a proletariat in the socialist sense. Furthermore, most of the workers in the factories, in rural areas in particular, could not have belonged to the proletariat but to the peasantry.

In order to play down this fact, which was most troublesome for the desired socialist revolution, the oldest and the most renowned among the Russian Marxist theoreticians, George Plekhanov, tried to separate the Russian peasantry into classes, assigning the poor peasants to the proletariat, the rich ones to the bourgeoisie. This sociological analysis which Lenin first proposed theoretically and later put into practice during the revolution is based upon the incorrect assumption that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were scarcely influenced at all by *Weltanschauung* and ethical views, but were exclusively determined by economic factors. Even Plekhanov and Sukhanov believed that the peasantry as a class, without any distinction between rich and poor, was "stupid, lazy, conservative," deeply devoted to "tsarism" and the "idiocy" of their life in the country. That such a class was declared to be the seed-bed of a proletarian revolution shows the basic ideologic dilemma of Marxism-Leninism.

To be sure, the peasants disguised as soldiers at the beginning of the revolution rendered most essential services to the Bolsheviks, but this they did not as class-conscious proletarians, but rather as land-hungry masses inimical to their masters, just as they had previously done under Razin and Pugachev.

While it cannot be denied that, at about the turn of the century, revolutionary Russia did have at its disposal a small group of Marxist-trained, class-conscious proletarians, these were not so much representatives of the interests of the Russian workers, as ideologic fellow-travelers of the revolutionary intelligentsia—a peculiar formation of Russian life, about which much more will have to be said.

Before the revolution Russia had neither a proletariat in the strict sense of the word, nor a bourgeois class as it is commonly understood. Historically, this fact may be explained by the absence of a virile, self-reliant, educated middle class. It was only after the liberal reforms of Alexander II that we witness the gradual rise of the commercial and industrial class, commonly known as the Russian bourgeoisie. As has been repeatedly stressed by Russian scholars, this new class was shaped decisively by the rising serfs on the one hand and by declining aristocracy on the other. This fact did not facilitate the consolidation of the new middle class. It has been justly pointed out that the transformation of the old and honorable merchant class into the modern European bourgeoisie divested the Russian middle class of all the characteristics that were typical of the old merchant class: diligence, thrift, foresight, and imaginative enterprise. As a matter of fact, it was a typical phenomenon in Russia, that the liberal, Anglicized grandchildren carelessly squandered in revelry and feasting the wealth earned by the hard work of their forebears. The Russian historian Fedotov explains this development by the fact that the newly formed bourgeoisie imitated the decadent nobility and was contaminated by it.

An even more basic reason than the absence of a true middle class way of thinking of the commercial and industrial class of Russia must be found in the fact that in pre-reform Russia land ownership was largely in the hands of the nobility, which

however, did not assume personal responsibility but entrusted it to the care of managers and to the toil of the serfs. Perhaps the reason for this may be found in the fact that the Russian people of all classes were far less attached to their possessions than in Western Europe. This fact had already been stressed by Baron Haxthausen, the "discoverer" of the Russian village commune. Tolstoy's renunciation of his property is by no means an isolated case in Russian history. Most of the great landowners of the province of Tver waived ownership of their land when they set their peasants free. In Russia, wealth was very often felt to be a moral burden, but probably never a moral duty. The conservative civic feeling of duty to one's possessions had not been very widespread. It is this trait which can explain why Gorky, soon after the revolution of 1905, succeeded in fleecing the bourgeoisie of millions of rubles for the further conduct of the revolution. It also explains why the bourgeoisie in the last decades before the revolution often fought with the Socialists against the government but scarcely ever with the government against the proletariat.

In order to comprehend this non-civic character of the Russian commercial and industrial classes, it would be necessary to go into numerous problems of Russian history which is impossible in this essay. For that reason only the most essential facts are mentioned. We know from the works of Jacob Burckhardt, Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and others, that there are many different sources from which capitalism sprang. Puritanism, English utilitarianism and moralism, and the rationalism of the enlightenment all contribute something. These factors had no great significance in Russia. Aristotelianism, a rational system, had not been taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church, which was more influenced by Platonism. Since Russia did not experience a Reformation, the spirit of Puritanism which, according to Max Weber, is closely related to the bourgeois way of thought, did not become a part of it. However, not only history, but also the great Russian plain, so rich in natural wealth, was not favorable to the molding of the Russian into a bourgeois. Geography tended toward promoting extrava-

gance rather than thrift, roaming rather than settling and building.

In this connection it is not without interest to note how negatively the most varied Russian philosophers have depicted the west European bourgeois. The socialist, Alexander Herzen, with passionate enthusiasm hastened to Paris, the holy city of the revolution, but soon returned to Russia, because he recognized the soul of Europe to be that of a Philistine. The conservative diplomat, Konstantin Leontiev, who ended his life as a monk in the famous Optina Hermitage, shook with rage when he thought that the remarkable history of the Occident would terminate in a capitalistic middle-class democratic swamp. This was a horror to his artistic soul. But Dostoevsky most strongly rejected the bourgeois and Philistine spirit when he portrays the devil who appears before Ivan Karamayov as a "petty bourgeois with all his possessions." We find in these three authors a social-ethical, esthetic, and religious rejection of the bourgeoisie.

That this rejection was not only a question of private opinions, but also of objective economic data, can be seen from the memoirs of the Minister of Finance, Count Witte, to whom Russia was indebted for her industrial structure and for her shift to the Western capitalistic forms of economy. In 1903 he pleaded with the Russian Committee of the Stock Exchange, "to establish a permanent office" and to "create its own newspaper," in order to influence public opinion and, particularly the political course of the government. All these proposals were made to remodel the weak structure of Russian capital and to create a bourgeoisie that would be fully aware of its strength.

To bear out my thesis that Russia possessed neither a proletariat nor a bourgeoisie, but only employers and employees, I can cite Russian literature which has always paid keen attention to the use of new social phenomena, and yet never produced a single work that comes to grips realistically and artistically with the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This struggle has been described over and over again in Soviet literature, but always only in works which were as far removed from life as from art.



If it is not scientifically feasible to call the Russian proletariat the villain of the revolution and the bourgeoisie as its arch-enemy, then the question arises: what were the forces that the revolution had liberated and against what was it directed? The answer is clear: it was the revolutionary intelligentsia who started the Russian revolution, for it had always considered the monarchy and the Church as its real enemies.

The concept of the intelligentsia cannot be understood in the sense of an educated class. In Russian colloquial language, which is of course backed by certain historical development, the term *intelligent* does not denote a person with higher or special education, but a person with certain specific views. Of course, the content and the form of these views have changed in the course of decades but they remained directed unalterably and firmly toward the same goal. This goal has two inter-connected connotations: Europe and freedom. The aim of the Russian intelligentsia, since its earliest beginnings, was to cause the downfall of the aristocracy and to change Russia into a democratic republic or a constitutional monarchy and thus ally it more closely to liberal Europe. The formulation of this goal and the will to bring it about invested the intelligentsia with a decided revolutionary character.

It is typical of the intelligentsia that representatives of the most varied ranks and social classes participated in it. Its earliest members were officers of the nobility who brought about the Decembrist rebellion. The part played by the nobility in the revolutionary movement had always been outstanding, even in the Bolshevik revolution. One need only mention the names of Radishchshev, Herzen, Bakunin, Prince Krapotkin, Morozov, Vera Figner, Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov, Lavrov, Chicherin, and Lunacharsky (the last two were Bolshevik Commissars). In the sixties, the sons of clerics (Chernyshevsky and Pisarev) became vocal and influential. At the close of the nineteenth and particularly during the twentieth century, sons of workers and peasants also gained greater importance in the struggle of the intelligentsia for the liberation of Russia. This social heterogeneity of the intelligentsia is sufficient proof that it represented not specific interests, but universally accepted



ideals. In my opinion, those are in the right who attempted to comprehend its essence through the idea of a monastic order. This designation was first used by the historian Annenkov, a contemporary of Alexander Herzen and Belinsky. The essence of the great Catholic orders of knighthood as defined by Soloviev was an alliance between the cross and the sword. The Christian cross was not defended by the intelligentsia. On the contrary, the symbol of the anointed autocracy was resisted with bombs and bullets.

Naturally, the order of the intelligentsia knew no fixed written rules of life and it did not obligate its members to monastic vows. Nevertheless, every Russian recognized at first glance those who had conspired in the revolution. Such a person obtained his specific stamp through the knowledge that his decision to work in a revolutionary organization divested his life of all security. Those who placed themselves at the disposal of the fighting organization knew well that they had signed a premature pact with death and that they would obey their leaders absolutely.

One may say that the Russian intelligentsia was confined to a stratum of society resembling a religious order and that it was composed mainly of youth. It originated at the beginning of the nineteenth century and its aim was destruction of the Russian monarchy.

The leading philosophers of the Slavophile school pointed out that the government and the ruling classes were greatly indebted to the simple people who fought so heroically against Napoleon and defeated him. The young officers who returned from Paris after the Napoleonic wars realized that the Christian faith of the simple peasant, his patriotism, his capacity to suffer, his humility, were more significant than the enlightenment and Voltairianism of their fathers and grandfathers. The tragedy of Russia was due to the gap between the Western education of the upper classes and the ignorance of the masses. The program of action of the Narodniki was the outcome of this Slavophile influence. Thus the decision arose "to go to the people," learn from them the truth, and to bring them freedom.

The movement, of "going to the people," is a typically Russian phenomenon.

It is tragic to see how the sons and daughters of the rich and educated members of the aristocracy, year after year, renounced everything, and disguised as peasants, roamed the country seeking to enlighten the people and to bring them freedom. The people did not understand these apostles and denounced them to the police. However, scorning all dangers of deportation and even of capital punishment, the young people pursued their goals. The Narodniki wanted to drive backward Russia to socialism just as quickly as Peter the Great wanted to industrialize and militarize it.

The theoretical basis of their movement was the belief that history is not subject to the dictatorship of immutably blind universal laws, as is taught by Marxism, but that it is molded by free individuals. The fight against evil cannot be won other than by self-sacrifice and the readiness of the individual to incur death. The main idea of the terrorist was not murder, but his own, individual death.

The terror of the People's Will group proved to be as ineffective as the earlier "going to the people." In no case did the terror lead to a softening of the regime; on the contrary, it led to the infliction of even more severe punishments. Thus doubts were raised in the ranks of the Narodniki, (later the Social Revolutionaries), as to the correctness of this course. Marxism benefited from this.

It was a relief to the fighters of the revolutionary intelligentsia after the failure of the terror, to be able to admit that history is not shaped by individuals, but by iron laws which the individual is powerless to surmount. The Marxist doctrine that history is based on economic laws and that all culture is merely a superstructure, explained the ineffectiveness of the Narodniki. This consideration not only facilitated the future course of the Social Revolutionaries but also eased their conscience.

The main difficulty which the Marxist doctrine offered was that the socialist revolution was possible only in highly industrialized countries. Plekhanov saw that Russia must follow the same course to socialism as other European countries. He con-

sidered the plan of the Narodniki to arrive at socialism through the village commune by by-passing capitalism, to be a purely Utopian scheme. According to his opinion, a socialist revolution in Russia was possible only if the peasants (80-90 percent of the population) were absorbed partly by the bourgeoisie and partly by the proletariat. Plekhanov still considered this theory to be correct even after the outbreak of the October revolution. In return it brought him, the founder of the Russian social democracy and its most important theoretician, and from whom Lenin profited much, a year's imprisonment shortly after power was seized by the Bolsheviks.

It is believed that Karl Marx understood the peculiarity of the Russian situation as an agrarian country and that he decided against Plekhanov in favor of the theory of the Narodniki. It is said that by taking this position he sanctioned Lenin's attempt to transform the bourgeois revolution into a socialist one.

From my point of view this seems to be a misrepresentation. For in 1881 Karl Marx wrote to Vera Zasulich that he could admit the possibility of a socialist revolution in Russia only under one condition, that such a revolution would simultaneously sweep Europe and "would become the signal for a revolution of the workers in the West, so that the two would complement each other." As everybody knows, this did not take place, so that according to Marx, Lenin should have renounced the establishment of Communism in Russia.

Lenin would scarcely have won the majority of the Social Democratic Party for his totalitarian program if the Russian intelligentsia had been composed of exclusively idealistic Narodniki and dogmatic Marxists. History teaches us that men without a political and intellectual ancestry have never attained real and lasting power. All revolutions have their traditions; and even madness, as Nietzsche puts it, is not completely irrational. Aside from the Western Europeans Marx and Engels, who were the Russian intellectual ancestors of Lenin and Stalin?

The first Bolshevik ancestors were Peter Tkachev (1844-1885) and the revolutionary organizer closely associated with him, Nechaev. Apart from these two, and superior to them in

every respect, was Michael Bakunin, whose spiritual characteristics, although greatly distorted and cheapened, may be readily recognized in some aspects of Bolshevism. This was probably felt by the Bolsheviks themselves, although immediately after the seizure of power they resisted the Anarchists by force of arms. It is surely not an accident that the Bolshevik Steklov wrote a three-volume work about Bakunin.

Tkachev was of the same opinion as the Narodniki, to the effect that Russia's path to socialism would bypass the capitalistic development. In 1875 he wrote to Engels that Western Marxism in its application to the East would occasionally have to be modified. His political associate, Nechaev, believed that in Russia this would not be possible without dictatorship and terror. People by themselves could never bring about the revolution. It could be achieved only by professional revolutionaries, solitary, dedicated men, absolutely free from bourgeois bonds of love and friendship.

According to Nechaev, such a professional revolutionary must be animated by a cold passion for revolutionary destruction and be prepared to die for the cause at any moment. He is also privileged to kill anyone who utters merely a defiant word against him and the revolution. Combined with this cold-blooded concept, there is in Nechaev a conscious commendation of immoral acts in the political struggle as well as in the personal life of the revolutionary; for in the struggle anything is allowed if it leads to victory. Although the revolution is carried on for the welfare of the people, it is also permissible to deceive and lead them astray. Education and enlightenment are detrimental to the people who are on the point of uprising because agitation is made more difficult.

The appeals of Nechaev and his associates breathe blood-thirsty hatred against all the powers of old Russia. There should be no mercy for the defeated enemy, i.e., the monarchy. All the members of the state administration are to be destroyed, because they cannot be reformed. All economic and industrial leaders are to be forced, at gunpoint, to work henceforth for the people instead of for themselves as they had done in the past. The

representatives of the free professions are to be bought like prostitutes, because they are by nature venal.

Bakunin, who was associated with Nachaev for a while, protested against his "revolutionary catechism." A convinced anarchist, the implacability of his anarchism and his hostility to organizations did indeed separate him from Marx. In his correspondence with the Italian socialist, Mazzini, Bakunin maintained that a revolution could not be organized and that its very organization would strangle it. In spite of these differences in feeling and thought, the influences of both Bakunin and Tkachev-Nechaev are clearly discernible in the Bolshevik Revolution.

The only bond which united the "statists" Tkachev and Nechaev with Bakunin's anarchism, was atheism. In his novel *The Possessed*, Dostoevsky endows the portrait of Stavrogin with certain features of Bakunin—the man who believes dogmatically in the devil incarnate. While Nechaev, resembled the devil more than Bakunin, he did not, however, believe in him. On the other hand, Bakunin says that we must recognize in the Biblical satan the prototype of a revolutionary. For this he praises the "primeval rebel" for having begun the great work of liberating man from the misleading vagueness and disgraceful enslavement of religion. For that reason, he exclaims: "Let us trust in the eternal spirit which destroys everything completely only because it bears within itself, mysteriously, the well-spring of life and creation." Examined more closely, this statement substitutes Satan for God and the revolution for the creation. That is rather an unusual type of atheism.

When I characterize Tkachev, Nechaev, and Bakunin as Lenin's ancestors, it does not mean that I deny Lenin's devotion to the theories of Marx and Engels. To be sure, Lenin was a Marxist. It was merely that Lenin's interpretation of Marxism was influenced decisively by the fact that he was determined to realize a socialist revolution in a country which lacked the objective premises for such a revolution. Because of that, Plekhanov and other Soviet Democrats felt that they had to abandon the deepening of the revolution which had broken out in Russia. Lenin was against this, first of all, because he wished to use



the Russian Revolution as a fuse with which to ignite Western Europe. Hence, he exploited the eschatological and militant aspects of the Marxist doctrine (it is well-known that he was thoroughly familiar with Clausewitz) and proclaimed it an absolute gospel of salvation.

The inner kinship between Lenin's creation and the theories of Nechaev-Tkachev and Bakunin is in Lenin's passionate and aggressive atheism. It is well-known that Lenin was outraged by the philosophic aberrations of his followers Lunacharsky and Gorky, who, under the influence of Avenarius, strayed from the atheist path and attempted to search for God. In his letter to Gorky, Lenin describes every belief in God, "who is dead," whether that of the priests, metaphysicians, or humanists as a "pestilential odor," a "desecration of the dead," or "infamy." This hatred against "a dead" God explains the vicious forms of the Bolshevik attacks on religion and the Church. In the literature of Western Europe, it has frequently been asserted that Bolshevism should be interpreted as a new formulation of the social doctrines of the early Christian Church, a kind of "emanation" of Christianity. Certain representatives of this religious socialism have done much harm in this respect. Although not an emanation of Christianity, Bolshevism, as Berdyaev pointed out, bears the traces of an imitation of Christianity. One can surely agree with him that at the outbreak of the October Revolution Bolshevism was experienced perhaps not so much by its promulgators and preachers as by the masses of soldiers in an exalted state of mind. The mission of redeeming the world proletariat, approached the Old Testament concept of God's chosen people; the doctrine of the classless society merged with the vision of the Kingdom of God, and the Marxist prognosis of the collapse of the old world was awaited with the impatience of an eschatological expectation of the millenium.

This interpretation of scientific Marxism was bolstered partly by the pseudo religious form in which Lenin clothes his dogma and his party organization. This pseudo church regarded Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as its prophets. It made the infallible Lenin its pope and endowed the members of the politburo and the Central Committee with the dignity of secular priests.



The elite of the Party was given the name of the "vanguard of the proletariat," but it kept its distance from the masses of the working class, which it merely designated as the proletariat while denying to it the proletarian consciousness.

As early as 1903, at the Second Congress of the Social Democratic party, Lenin asserted that the party should not be organized along democratic but along bureaucratic principles. He maintained that only those should become members who were prepared to accept unquestionably the party leadership and who participated actively in the party organization. With these tenets he disassociated himself from the Social Democracy. Later he erected upon them the Communist party. He considered that only those should become Communists who were prepared to obey blindly, sacrifice gladly, and work efficiently. All else should be thrown overboard. This interpretation of the intrinsic importance of the party also accounts for the initial concern for its ideologic and moral purity. In 1921, when the party had increased from 200,000 to 700,000 members, a general purge was decided upon which led to the removal of 180,000 members. A further sifting and screening reduced it to a mere 350,000. Among the motives for the excommunication were "nonproletarian ancestry," and religious and bourgeois tendencies.

Lenin, like Nechaev, was convinced that neither the working class nor the peasantry could ever bring about a revolution. He reproached the working class for being time and again submerged in trade unionism. Moral considerations were just as alien to Lenin as they were to Nechaev, since he himself declared that any criminal, even a decidivist, would be more welcome on the barricades than a convinced social democrat. This amorality, however, does not by any means contradict the efforts of the party to keep it "pure." Bolshevik purity has always had a sociologic character, never a moral one. All that mattered was to gain a loyal, genuine proletariat for the party. On the other hand, the general ethical virtues of such a fighter were not essential. Lenin himself, as reported by many who knew him well and for a long time, was devoid of moral feelings; all his offenses against his colleagues were based on his dedicated

love of the revolution which he regarded, just as did Bakunin, as a frenzy of destruction of the old world. The well-known words of the founder of anarchism at the Slavonic Congress corresponds completely to the frame of mind in which Lenin arrived in Petersburg from Switzerland in April, 1917: "From the sea of blood and fire in Moscow, the stars of the revolution will rise high and gloriously and will become the beacon of the whole liberated human race. You should devote yourselves entirely and unequivocally to the Revolution. You must burn like a flame in order to perform a miracle." This fire burned in Lenin's breast and Russia was set ablaze by it.

I deny that the party of the Bolsheviks can be characterized as a party forged by the masses of the people. I regard it as the last formation of the intelligentsia, which triumphed in its fight against the social revolutionary Narodniki and the social democracy. In this connection it is important to realize that the Bolshevik intelligentsia paid for its victory over the monarchy by committing suicide. This came about because as early as 1903, Lenin was resolved that the course to be taken for the liberation of Russia must come via dictatorship and that a rapprochement between Russia and Europe had to be preceded by a struggle against capitalist Europe. Thus the ideal of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia — "Europe and Freedom" — was completely abandoned.

Since October, 1919, so much has changed in the Soviet Union that sometimes one loses sight of these changes. The anti-militarists of days gone by command, at present, perhaps the largest army in the world. The former internationalists promote the nationalist movements of the Near and Far East. Militant atheists at the beginning of the revolution, the present-day Communists made peace with the Greek Orthodox Church and are sending theological students to the European universities. The promoters of modern art who, in 1918-1919, carried on their shield the futurist poet Mayakovsky, the artist Marc Chagall, the revolutionary stage manager Meyerhold, and the revolutionary film director Eisenstein, today defend socialist realism which is not unlike the tendentious naturalism of the end of the last century. However much has changed in the Soviet Union

one thing remains the same: the suppression of the free individual, and Lenin's words still hold good: "We must know and should never forget that the juridical as well as the practical application of the Constitution is based on the fact that the Party builds, improves, and renews everything, always according to one and the same principle."

The West European press and scholarship often speak of the new Soviet intelligentsia. This expression which combines the two words "Soviet" and "intelligentsia," is an impossibility, psychologically and sociologically. The pre-revolutionary intelligentsia was definitely an elite of thought; in many cases it was without specialized training and experience. The new intelligentsia is a growing army of specialists and technicians greatly interested in working, indeed passionately, at building up the Soviet Union, and although they may be inimical to the government, they are, or pretend to be, Soviet patriots. The real successors of the old intelligentsia can most likely be found among the inmates of prisons and concentration camps, the brotherhoods of the underground church, and the artists and writers who have been disciplined by the regime; in short among all those who had been rejected by Soviet life and who suffer because of all that is happening in their native land. Only when the suffering of these people will generate an unbearable conflict of conscience in the *new* Soviet intelligentsia, can a process of regeneration begin which could result in a meeting with Western Europe in the spirit of justice and freedom.

# Khrushchev: A Political Profile

## I

By WILLIAM K. MEDLIN

FROM behind most of the jolting surprises in Soviet politics in post-Stalin Russia there has emerged the deft hand of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. His political craft marks him as one of the most adroit political figures in the history of modern Russian government, if not of the European scene in general. Through a quilt-like pattern of political maneuvers, he has succeeded in becoming the strong man of the present Soviet regime.

In terms of position, Khrushchev occupies seats in all four of the top political bodies in the Soviet scheme of government: Party Presidium (since 1938), Party Secretariat (since 1949), Council of Ministers (since 1958), and Presidium of the legislature (since 1935). Through his post of Chairman of the Russian Bureau under the Party's Central Committee, he exercises an additional and decisive influence over the vast Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). Having sat continually in the Central Committee since 1934, he has had experience with major policy problems of the U.S.S.R. since that time. Khrushchev holds the military rank of Lieutenant General of the Army and sometimes dons his uniform for the public platform. Briefly, these are the formal proportions.

At the time of Stalin's demise in March 1953, no prominent observer or writer of Soviet affairs considered the then visible proportions of Mr. Khrushchev to be sufficiently impressive to count him in the running for Stalin's political heritage. Yet, during the four and one-half years from early 1953 to mid-1957, this man rose above all his senior colleagues to occupy the place of primacy in the regime. In this respect, his climb was not unlike that executed by Stalin during 1923-27, when he gathered

in his hands the vital cords of power to determine the course of an empire. Unlike Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Beria, Khrushchev was never so close to Stalin so as to operate the inner workings of Stalin's apparatus of controls. One must look, it seems, elsewhere than in the late dictator's pattern of patronage for a full picture of the new Soviet boss.

To help disclose the methods and designs that were instrumental in promoting the Khrushchevian triumph, this paper will explore Khrushchev's career from its early days. Because verified data on much of his personal life and background have not become available, attention here will concentrate mostly on the political aspects of his experiences.

*Early Career in Ukraine.* Russian-born Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev came to Ukraine's Donbass when he was a very young man. There he worked as a fitter in the iron works and factories near Yuzovka (later renamed Stalino), a growing metallurgical center.<sup>1</sup> What actually happened to his family has not been clearly established. Official Soviet sources insist on Khrushchev's peasant origin at Kalinovka, Kursk Province, just a few miles from the ethnic Ukrainian border.<sup>2</sup> These sources, which have been documented over two and a half decades, state that as a boy he was hired out to work as a shepherd and that later he migrated to the Donbass. It has also been said that Khrushchev's father was the descendant of a *chinovnik* and a member of the imperial state service, who held an estate at Kalinovka. Sergei Khrushchev became involved, according to this account,<sup>3</sup> in reformist groups antagonistic to the Tsar and, as a result, lost both rank and estate. We do not know if, in fact, the Sergei Nikolaevich Khrushchev (-ëv) who served in the territorial administration of the imperial Ministry of Internal affairs was N. S. Khrushchev's father.<sup>4</sup> We are unfortunately deprived of pertinent archival materials of the Kursk

<sup>1</sup>Visti, Kiev, January 28, 1938.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.; *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., vol. 46, p. 390; *Vechernyaya Moskva*, February 9, 1935.

<sup>3</sup>Related by a former resident of the Ukraine.

<sup>4</sup>*Adres-Kalendar; obshchaya rospis*, St. Petersburg, 1898 and ff.



Province lost after 1917.<sup>5</sup> While these various data provide much for speculation, they represent lacunae which impair any serious biographical attempt on his early life. It is appropriate, therefore, that a methodical account of Khrushchev's career begin with his Donbass experience.

While Khrushchev was learning the fitter's trade, he could also learn something about the heavy industrial complex in the Don Basin which, on the eve of World War I, was feverishly forging ahead in productivity capacity. The capital investment structure there was heavily supported by West European firms. For the purposes of leftist political parties, Western capitalists served, of course, as major scapegoats for Russia's social ills. Although Khrushchev was exposed to revolutionary socialist and Marxist influences in workers' communities, no evidence has yet appeared to show that he participated in these movements prior to or during the first World War. Likewise, there is no indication that Khrushchev, who was 20 years old in 1914, was drafted into military service. Defense work, poor health, or family connections must have decided against his entering the imperial army.

When the Tsar's imperial rule terminated in February, 1917, the Ukrainian separatist movement had approached close to its historical goal of political independence. During April-June 1917, the Ukrainians set up an independent government at Kiev,<sup>6</sup> so that when the Bolsheviks in November seized the Russian capital of Petrograd and declared themselves to be the new government under Lenin, an independent Ukraine already existed as a *de facto* state beyond the confines of Russia proper. During this fast-moving episode, Khrushchev had had no connections with Lenin's Party organization. But such connections were not too long in coming. They were made in the first part of 1918, when the German Army occupied and controlled Ukraine in opposition to both independent Ukrainian forces and the Bolsheviks. After the Red Army attacked and took Kiev

<sup>5</sup>Kursk. Gubernskoe arkhivnoe delo. *Desiat let arkhivnogo stroitelstva v Kurskoi Gubernii*, 1928.

<sup>6</sup>M.S. Grushevsky, *A History of the Ukraine*, 3rd ed., New Haven, 1948; and I. Mirchuk, ed. *Ukraine and Its People*, Munich, 1949.



on February 10, 1918, the Ukrainian Rada government joined its army with the Germans in driving out Red forces. It was only at this time, when Ukraine was in danger of being lost for Russia, that Khrushchev cast his lot with the Bolshevik Party and became a member of the Red Guards.<sup>7</sup> At Yuzovka in March 1918, he joined a local military unit under the same command as the First Don Proletarian Regiment.<sup>8</sup> Nikita Khrushchev was 24 years old, and his decision put him on a path from which there would be no turning back.

As the Civil War deepened and lengthened, Khrushchev remained loyal to the Bolshevik cause. The over-riding political issue at that time was the interests of Russia as against Ukrainian separatism influenced strongly by German and then (after 1918) Polish interests. His work in the Red Guards involved mainly political duties,<sup>2</sup> whereby he helped to organize support for the Bolshevik Party and the Red Army, to maintain discipline among recruited Red Guards, and to report to headquarters signs of locally organized opposition to Bolshevik rule. During part of this time Khrushchev served on the front in the Donbass region.

When the invading Poles were finally defeated in 1920 and after Soviet control was established in Ukraine, Khrushchev left his military-political career to return to work in the coal and iron industry in the Yuzovka region.<sup>2</sup> He had made no contacts sufficiently interesting to draw him into Party or Government work, and it seems that he must not have been much inspired to seek such opportunity. His revolutionary role had been a minor one indeed, and so he turned back to his trade. After having worked for about a year, however, another kind of opportunity arose. He was able to apply, at the age of 27,<sup>9</sup> for a secondary education. Along with about 1,000 other Party supporters in Ukraine who were eligible, he enrolled in a *Rabfak* (*Rabochii fakultet*), or Worker's School. The Russian Com-

<sup>7</sup>The precise date in 1918 when Khrushchev joined the Bolsheviks is not given in available sources, but a study of the circumstances as related suggests that it was in late February or early March.

<sup>8</sup>*Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, vol. 3, Moscow, 1957, pp. 135-36.

<sup>9</sup>N.A. Bulganin, and N.S. Khrushchev. *Rech'i vo vremya prebyvaniya v Indii, Birme, i Afganistane*, Nov. - December 1955, Moscow, 1955, p. 173.

munist Party had initiated this program of education in most Soviet cities as a means toward forming a new technical class of industrial managers. The new government-operated program required time for experimentation in order to get well underway. Only eight Rabfaks were functioning in Ukraine by 1922 with an enrollment of 1,400 students.<sup>10</sup> The student bodies of these schools were composed almost entirely of Party members and supporters, since the limited facilities for schooling required careful Party control over admissions. Although the Soviet government in Moscow had waived most of the normal entrance requirements for persons enrolling in general education establishments (so as to favor workers and peasants), Rabfak applicants were required to be able to read and write, to know basic arithmetic, and to have an elementary knowledge of Soviet political economy. Non-academic requirements for persons aged 25-30 were four years of Bolshevik Party membership and six years' experience in industry or agriculture. In early 1922 Khrushchev could meet both conditions.

As one of the select "Party thousands," Khrushchev began to attend school at the Donets Mining School's Rabfak in Yuzovka.<sup>11</sup> The local Communist Party organization was strong and reputed to be one of the main centers of Bolshevik activity in Ukraine. Khrushchev took a rather intensive, technically oriented secondary-school course spread over a three-year period. His main subjects were mathematics (algebra, geometry, and trigonometry), physics, chemistry, a natural science, Marxist-Leninist political economy, and a foreign language (German) in addition to Russian language and literature. Schooling was free; dormitories and a modest stipend were provided. Such provisions were seldom sufficient to ensure a healthy existence for most students, but they helped to attract ambitious and loyal workers to the Rabfak program. Students themselves organized self-help services and mutual aid societies. Khrushchev avows that they "studied hard and strived . . . to master the sciences."<sup>9</sup> A fraternal *esprit de corps* knit them together into a kind of

<sup>10</sup>Fredrika M. Tandler, *The Workers' Faculty (Rabfak) System in the USSR*. Columbia University Thesis, unpublished, 1955, p. 331.

<sup>11</sup>Now a higher institute, the school bears Khrushchev's name.

crusading vanguard of "social builders" who believed in the regime's promises of creating, on both the remains and the rubble of the old, a new society for mankind. At this early stage of Bolshevik rule the prize of getting a secondary education under official auspices represented a call to future political or industrial leadership within the nascent Soviet hierarchy.

As if to fortify his already acquired educational advantage, Khrushchev, with the approval if not on the insistence of the Yuzovka Committee of the Communist Party, was appointed by his fellow Communists to the position of Secretary of the Communist Party Committee at the Rabfak.<sup>2</sup> This post, held while he was a student, was the most important development of his political career up to that time. Why should such a position have been so significant? Precisely because through the functions and powers conferred on him, the Secretary supervised operations of the various Party cells which conducted the Party's campaign to recruit and train new members, the work of keeping check on the political reliability of old members, and the reporting to Party administrators of disaffection and of activities hostile to the regime. Khrushchev's job then was to improve and replenish cadre strength in the Communist Party and to represent the Party line in all school life. It made him the link between the top political authority in the local government—and through it to the central government—and the Rabfak students and teachers at the Rabfak in Yuzovka. The post gave him invaluable experience at the grass roots and, still more important, it gave him his first political spurs, with which he could earn more responsible tasks in the years ahead. His evident success as a local Party administrator brought him reappointment as the school's Secretary by the local Bolsheviks. Political authority and the acquisition of elements of basic academic disciplines, added to his native shrewdness, helped Khrushchev to develop the sinews of political command required of a career Bolshevik boss.

*Apprenticeship to Power.* Termination of his secondary schooling and his assignment to a field post in 1925 came at a particularly auspicious time for Khrushchev: a change in

Ukrainian Party leadership had been decided upon in Moscow, where the growing influence of Secretary General Iosif Stalin in the Central Committee was making itself felt in most key appointments throughout the Party hierarchy. Named to replace Ukrainian Party Chief E. I. Kviring, who was "relieved of office on his own request," was Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, who was formally installed as Secretary General of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee on April 7, 1925.<sup>12</sup> Kaganovich was one of Stalin's most trusted lieutenants in the Party center at Moscow, where he had headed the vital Personnel Organization and Assignments Department under the Central Committee,<sup>13</sup> a department controlled by Stalin's Secretariat. It was this office that developed the fundamental cadres control system for the entire Communist Party, whereby the necessary links between central Party offices and the economic administration of the country were formed. Mr. Kaganovich brought with him to Ukraine these organizational patterns and methods of control. It was his task to bring Ukraine uniformly under his authority—Stalin's authority—and so he employed the new cadres system as an instrument to expel from Party and government positions supporters of Trotsky and, later, those of other Soviet leaders opposed to Stalin. Kaganovich, a 32-year old Jew who was born and raised in Ukraine, sought new, young administrators for the Party who were qualified by talent to supervise and by training to learn industrial operations and agricultural production. He wanted subordinates who could be counted upon to build up a loyal corps of Party workers in towns and cities, the nuclei of the Communist Party web.

It was in this political situation that Khrushchev began to make his way in 1925, when he was assigned as Secretary of the Party Committee in Petrovo-Marinsky district of Yuzovka (Stalino after July 1924), heart of the then Donets Province.<sup>1</sup> Although not a conspicuous post, it was located in one of the major industrial centers of the Soviet Union, one which Khrushchev knew as he would know the inside of his pocket. Only eight weeks after Kaganovich assumed command of the Ukrain-

<sup>12</sup>*Visti*, Kharkov, April 8, 1925.

<sup>13</sup>*Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, vol. 30, col. 516.

ian Party, he made an inspection tour of the important towns,<sup>14</sup> many of which were familiar territory to him. He was escorted around the Donets Province by Radchenko, then Secretary of the Party Committee there and Khrushchev's big boss. This visit by Kaganovich to Stalino was the first occasion that Khrushchev, along with scores of other Party functionaries, met Stalin's chief representative in Ukraine.

There is no evidence that Khrushchev's career was particularly enhanced by the Kaganovich visit; a minor light in the local ruling clique, he had only just begun his career. But future relationships with Secretary General Kaganovich lay ahead. Meanwhile, Khrushchev worked diligently in his Stalino post under the local Party head, Moiseenko, accumulating experience as a grassroots administrator and organizer for the Party, that dispenser of privileges and main channel to future careers. In November 1925, Khrushchev helped play host to a German workers' delegation which visited Stalino. The Germans met with local officials and appeared at mass meetings called in their honor.<sup>15</sup> At these gatherings the German workers declared their support of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and denounced the policies of the German government of Stresemann and also of the German Socialist Party. This rare brush with the outside world was one of few contacts that Nikita Khrushchev had experienced, or would ever experience until quite late in his life. The occasion provided a sharp contrast with the encounters he had had with the German Army not many years before.

In the middle 1920's Khrushchev was not sufficiently prominent to be chosen a deputy to the Ukrainian legislature (called the Central Executive Committee), where the Communist Party's program was formally adopted as state law. Neither did he get elected to the central bodies of the Ukrainian Party in December 1925. Nevertheless, during 1926-27 he steadily improved his Party standing in Stalino, and by mid-1927 he had become one of the leading officials under Stroganov who had become Secretary of the District Party Committee.<sup>16</sup> Khrushchev

<sup>14</sup>*Visti*, June 8 ff., 1925.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, *Visti*, November 21, 1925.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, *Visti*, November 18, 1927.



supervised organizational and personnel work performed under the local Party Committees. When the 10th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party met in November 1927, Kaganovich and his aides named Khrushchev to the key and select Credentials Commission of the Congress as its second-ranking member. As assistant to the Chairman, Demchenko, a Ukrainian who functioned as personnel administrator for Kaganovich in the Ukrainian Central Committee, Khrushchev controlled the checking of all certifying papers held by the more than 1,000 delegates to the Party Congress. In a superficial way, this function might be likened to seating delegates to a party convention in an American one-party state. It symbolized, in a discreet way, the sound working relationship and confidence that had developed over the previous two years between Nikita Khrushchev and the Ukrainian Party's top leaders, including Lazar Kaganovich.

Khrushchev took an active part in the floor proceedings at the 10th Congress. Speaking on Party administration and organization, he made proposals which later were put into practice:

While combatting the opposition, we should not forget about the practical matters of party organization. I deem it necessary to raise . . . a number of questions . . . first of all, I propose that, in major industrial centers and districts, secretariats of District Committees be created. Some persons may argue that the creation of such secretariats would remove certain matters from the jurisdiction of the District Party Committee and thus encroach on democracy. However, I believe that, far from violating the basic principle of party democracy, the creation of secretariats would take away from the District Party Committee petty secondary matters they now handle, and enable them to focus their attention on basic questions.

My second proposal is to revise the rule on reelecting bureaus of party organizations and on convening district conferences. The Stalinsky District is of the opinion that the reelection of bureaus should be held every 6 months, and district party conferences should be convened once a year (voices of approval from the floor). Such changes are dictated by purely practical objectives of our work.<sup>17</sup>

Keeping in mind that the top Party officials must have endorsed Khrushchev's proposals prior to their presentation on the floor, we cannot assume that he was their sole author; but

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, *Visti*, November 29, 1927.



we can assume that he was the person chosen to advance them because of his responsibility for the Party work which his proposals enjoined. These proposals bore a careful concern for organizational management, a field in which Nikita Khrushchev was becoming a specialist.

Khrushchev's work in the lesser districts and wards did not bring him much into public view, nor did it earn for him a seat in Ukraine's ruling body, the Party Central Committee. The new Committee elected on November 29, 1927, did not include Khrushchev among its 120 members.<sup>18</sup> There were many new names in the membership list, however, and it reflected the general organizational policy of the Party under Kaganovich's rule: to exclude from positions of influence all Party and government officials who represented factional and "anti-Party" tendencies. Third-echelon functionaries like Khrushchev were carrying out this policy in their day-to-day work in local committees, where the secretariats had become the real power behind the centralized dictatorship. In the traditionally monolithic temple of Russian politics, Stalin's aides wielded this organizational weapon ruthlessly. In Ukraine, Kaganovich filled the created vacancies with new faces and more recent adherents to the Bolshevik cause.<sup>19</sup> The newcomers had not been prominent during the revolutionary and early days of the Soviet regime. It was these newer "hierarchs" that Khrushchev and other lesser comrades worked for and supported in their climb to power. For them it was the only way open toward advancement, privileges, and power. During 1925-27, the Ukrainian Central Committee under Kaganovich's whip almost completely replenished itself with new blood, and although Khrushchev did not, as we have noted, become a member, his responsibilities in Stalino kept him in frequent contact with key officials working under the Committee and in its subordinate offices. Party directives called on the local officials to act vigorously against "anti-Party and anti-Soviet groups" who were followers of Bolsheviks formerly

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, *Visti*, November 30, 1927.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, *Visti*, January 24, 1928; see issues during and following the 10th Congress.

high in the regime but now disgraced.<sup>20</sup> Those who supported Zinoviev, Kamenev, Ishchenko, Rakovsky, and others were purged from Party membership along with scores of officials charged with being remiss in their political and organizational work.<sup>21</sup> The management of Party and government machinery was being recast in a Stalinist mold. The political bosses in Stalino, Kharkov, and Kiev worked hard to stamp this mold on Ukraine.

Late in 1928 Khrushchev transferred from his Stalino post to another one in Kiev, where he assumed the job of Secretary of the Party Committee. Kiev meant a new and rich experience. As the ancient cultural and spiritual capital of Russia, and later of Ukraine, it represented great traditions, a rich and fought-for heritage. While the Ukrainian political capital was located temporarily at Kharkov, Kiev remained symbolically the center of Russo-Ukrainian civilization and aspirations. Not least of the latter were a strong separatist tendency and cultural aims antagonistic to Moscow's own plans for the richest of its fiefs. In this setting, Khrushchev came to know and feel the pulse of Ukraine.

In the meantime Stanislaw Kosior, who had returned to his native Ukraine from Moscow, had become the new Party chief replacing Kaganovich, who was promoted to high posts in Moscow.<sup>22</sup> Although Kaganovich had fashioned a new political machine in Ukraine, Kosior faced continued dissidence in the republic, especially in Western Ukraine. The demands of Stalin's leftward shift in economic policies in 1928 called for complete suppression of any "independent" voices in Party or State. Kosior required his local secretaries to bring every possible pressure to bear on deviating "renegades" through the appropriate Party

<sup>20</sup>The Russian and Ukrainian press for this period contained frequent instructions to local Party Committees on the "struggle against the enemies" of the people, Party, and government.

<sup>21</sup>*Visti*, January 5 ff., 1928.

<sup>22</sup>Kosior took over as Secretary and leading member of the Politburo and Orgburo, of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee early in June 1928. *Visti*, June 15, 1928. In effect, Kosior and Kaganovich simply switched positions between Kharkov and Moscow, where Kaganovich became a Secretary under Stalin.

and government agencies, and Party whips at Khrushchev's level were congratulated by the Ukrainian leadership for their "vigorous and active struggle against rightist deviationism."<sup>23</sup>

When Kosior called the 11th Conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party in April 1929, to check up on the current situation and to lay groundwork for new programs, Khrushchev attended as a delegate representing the Kiev Party Organization. After delivery of the major addresses, Khrushchev, on the third day of the proceedings, had his turn to mount the rostrum. Although his remarks fairly patterned those of his superiors, they contained, as they had at the 10th Congress, that emphasis on organizational affairs which had become characteristic of Khrushchev. After confessing the rightness of the central Party decisions on purging deviationists from membership, he pointed out that,

... you cannot rely on unanimous resolutions alone. Some comrades, under the impact of difficulties, begin to vacillate. Unfortunately, in explaining the basic aspects of our policies, we are not always so successful as we are in carrying on our daily business activities.

In my judgment, now that we face a considerable laxity in labor discipline, it is not the execution of our plans and objectives that we need but the explanation to every cell of its responsibilities for carrying out the assignments placed upon it. Speaking of the need to fight the rightists, we sometimes omit the vital questions whose solution helps the Party to manage basic difficulties as well as overcome hesitations and vacillations displayed by some unstable members of the Party. I believe that what we need now is to organize our work more effectively, to test every one as to whether he manages his work, to secure a correct handling of affairs, and thus to help the Party in overcoming all the difficulties as well as in fighting the rightist deviation which stems from such difficulties.<sup>24</sup>

Khrushchev's treatment of general Party policy revolves around his knowledge of and appreciation for fundamental organizational work. To him, the major problems facing the regime, which appear to take on an ideological character, are rudimentary problems to be solved through proper organizational work. He is saying, in other words, that deviations from central authority reflect defects in political and economic organization which are allowed by managerial personnel. Poor

<sup>23</sup>*Visti*, December 8, 1928; see also January 8, 1929.

<sup>24</sup>*Visti*, April 12, 1929.

organization—this is the breeding place of discontent and vacillations in the Party ranks. Khrushchev's attitude is pragmatic, and his words are forthright.

The 11th Ukrainian Party Conference was the last major political event in Khrushchev's Ukrainian career for some time to come. Shortly following this event, he received an exceptional opportunity to continue his education at the university level in Moscow. To live and study in the mecca of Soviet Communism—and of world Communism—, this was indeed a real "break" for an ambitious careerist like Khrushchev. Although our data does not indicate exactly what circumstances brought about his move to Moscow, it is well to recall that Kaganovich had gone there a year earlier to help direct the regime's cadres program. Khrushchev was selected for specialized training and Party work at the Stalin Academy for Heavy Industry in Moscow, one of a number of higher schools newly established for training adults to become qualified engineers and technicians in the expanding Soviet industry.<sup>25</sup> Others like Khrushchev, such as Maksim Saburov, were sent up from Ukraine.<sup>26</sup>

Khrushchev's initiative in Party work resulted in his appointment to the top political post at the Stalin Academy: Secretary of its Party Committee.<sup>25</sup> Although he was a newcomer to the school and to Moscow, he managed somehow to acquire this political plum. Through this position he was able to exercise influence over the careers of his classmates and, what is probably more important, he could develop with them and with superiors relationships which might one day become politically helpful, if not indispensable, in climbing up the hierarchical ladder. Resuming his formal education which had been interrupted in 1925, Khrushchev tackled the engineering program of higher mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Although he spent about a year and a half in regular attendance at the Academy, one may candidly raise the question as to whether his political activities overshadowed his scholastic endeavors during that time. At any rate, he terminated his engineering studies in January 1931 to resume full-time political work. At

<sup>25</sup>*Vechernyaya Moskva*, February 9, 1935.

<sup>26</sup>*Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., vol. 37, p. 563.

this juncture in his career, Nikita Khrushchev was one of the growing class of Soviet-formed elite: pledged in loyalty to the Stalinist regime, educated to a level well above the general (including Party) average and dedicated to the cause of socialist construction. Membership in such an elite spelled an attractive future for a onetime Donbass worker.

As one of many lesser Party secretaries, Khrushchev began to learn and administer the affairs of one of Moscow city's many districts (*raiony*) in early 1931. This assignment was not unlike his earlier ones in its functional aspects, since every Party secretariat constituted, in essence, a kind of behind-the-scenes anti-chamber to the next-higher level of political power. But this was Moscow. Here, at the nerve center of empire, both in centuries past and in more recent years men of simple and unfavored origin had come to seek fortune, favor, power. At the age of 36 and less than six years after having completed high school education, Nikita Khrushchev set foot on the threshold of great power. His apprenticeship was over; it was time to put his talents and connections to work. What he would make of his Moscow opportunity would fundamentally affect his position in the Party machine and hierarchy, his future role in Soviet government, and his ability to survive in the one-way street of Party politics under Stalin. To try to understand the importance of Khrushchev's Moscow career, and to follow closely its course, will be the focus of a subsequent paper.

*(To be continued)*



# A Russian Historian at Harvard

By SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

Now that Russian technological and scientific achievements have intensified Western interest in the Soviet Union, and the demand for competent teachers of Russian subjects is running high, it seems almost incredible that only ten or fifteen years ago there were few openings for specialists in Russia's history, literature, and social problems. Before the war, the demand was even smaller. Although the study of Russia's past was still in its infancy, in Europe as well as in America, in the 1920's and the 1930's very few of the Russian historians who found themselves abroad after 1917 were able to continue, at foreign universities, their work of research and teaching. To be sure, a few of them lectured at Russian émigré institutions of higher learning in Germany or Czechoslovakia; Miliukov and two or three others were able to give some courses at the Sorbonne—but these were all occasional, sporadic activities, affording them no opportunities to establish permanent, serious schools of historical studies or to devote all their time to scholarly pursuits.

Things were somewhat better in this country, where foreign birth and even the lack of American citizenship did not bar scholars from taking part in academic life. Several Russian historians were able to continue their work in the United States before the Second World War, and two of them, M. M. Karpovich at Harvard and G. V. Vernadsky at Yale, even have trained a new generation of American specialists in Russian history. For thirty years, since Harvard invited him in 1927 to lecture in Russian history, Professor Karpovich has guided the education of future specialists in that field, at one of the finest universities in the Western world. The recently published fourth volume of *Harvard Slavic Studies*<sup>1</sup> is a striking illustration of

<sup>1</sup>*Harvard Slavic Studies*, vol. IV: *Russian Thought and Politics* ed. by H. McLean, M. Malia & G. Fischer, Harvard University Press, 1957.

the scope and fruitfulness of his work. Dedicated to their distinguished teacher, the volume contains twenty-seven articles by his former students for the doctorate in Russian history who are now teaching at various American universities.

Perhaps his birthplace, Tiflis (he was born August 3, 1888), one of the most multi-national cities of Russia, situated at a point where Asia and Europe meet, had something to do with the ease with which Karpovich, in the 1920's, entered the totally unfamiliar American milieu and attained a prominent position in a foreign academic world. Perhaps it should be noted that his grandfather was a Pole, apparently from a Polonized family of Belorussian gentry, his grandmother, Princess Tumanov, a Georgian, and his mother a pure Great Russian, sister of the well-known student of medieval Russia, Presniakov. In such a typical "Russian Empire" family, he had the opportunity to become accustomed since childhood to diverse cultural trends, and no doubt learned to respect, to "try on" spiritually and to combine within himself the most divergent national traditions.

Karpovich's early childhood and high school years were spent in his native Tiflis. The revolution of 1905-1906, with its particularly violent repercussions in the Transcaucasus, had a strong impact on the high school student. For a time, he joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Later, his benevolent nature and his broad views brought him closer to the Russian liberals, the Cadets, and in maturity his political and scientific position was one of enlightened liberalism. He spent the summer of 1905 in Geneva, where he met a number of Russian political émigrés. His absence from Russia saved him from personal participation in the revolution. Though he did not become involved in the militant "activism" of the political group closest to him at the time, he did go so far as to propagate socialist-revolutionary views among high school and university students. This was enough for the authorities to notice and arrest him, in December 1905. He remained under arrest for a month. The sentence that followed was more than lenient: the young man was ordered to leave the Transcaucasus but was allowed to live anywhere else in Russia, including the capitals. In the fall of 1906 he en-

rolled as a student in the Department of History at Moscow University, where literary crowds of students and citizens of Moscow flocked to the lectures of V. O. Kliuchevsky. However, at that time Kliuchevsky was giving only his famous course in Russian history and did not conduct students' seminars, so Karpovich's teachers were M. M. Bogoslovsky and D. M. Petrashevsky.

Mikhail Mikhailovich was graduated in 1914. His candidate's thesis was a study on "Alexander I and the Holy Alliance." After working for a short time at the Historical Museum, Karpovich was attached to the War Ministry as secretary of the Special Council of Representatives of the Zemstvo, Municipalities and Industry at the Ministry. The post offered wonderful opportunities to observe the Empire's administrative machinery in action and to come into close working contact with a wide range of people active in Russian public life.

In April 1917, a fortuitous meeting on the Nevsky Prospect with B. Bakhmetiev, an old friend of the family, changed the course of Karpovich's life. As he himself tells it, Bakhmetiev, who had just been appointed ambassador to Washington, offered him the position of secretary and, noticing the young man's hesitation, promised him that he would be able to return to Russia, if he wished, by Christmas of the same year. Who could have foreseen in those seemingly cloudless—politically speaking—April days that by October the way home would be permanently closed?

For five years, in his temporary role of diplomat, the young scholar, as it were, studied history in the making. Probably the most interesting part of his career in those years was the Peace Conference at Paris, where, from December 1918 to June 1919, he worked with the Russian Political Council—a group of Russian diplomats and political leaders privately trying to safeguard Russia's national interests during the peace negotiations between the Allies and the Central Powers.

In the following years, while still carrying out his duties at the Russian embassy in Washington, Karpovich was gradually drawn into American academic life—lecturing, attending academic meetings, becoming a member of the Political Institute

at Williams College. After the Russian Imperial embassy was closed, the young émigré scholar lived for a time in New York. In 1927 he began teaching at Harvard, following the retirement of Professor Robert Lord, his former associate at the Paris conferences.

At Harvard, the talented Russian historian quickly gained the respect of his colleagues and great popularity among the students. I myself have been privileged to witness, in the crowded auditorium at Sever Hall, the students' unflagging attention and frequent enthusiasm at his lectures. His objectivity, the unruffled calm which never deserted him even when he dealt with the most tragic or controversial aspects of history, his masterly command of language, and his graceful style invariably left a strong and lasting impression on the audience. I especially admired the form of his lectures and the brilliant fusion of philosophical thought with the most objective recording of historical facts. Constantly drawing parallels between Russian and Western-European as well as American-history, he made it easier for the students to understand Russia's problems, and made Russian history seem less "exotic." I remember, for instance, a lecture on the reforms of Peter the Great. Speaking of the uproar which greeted the ukase banning beards, Karpovich pointed out that respect for the beard as part of a venerable tradition was by no means a uniquely Russian phenomenon: as late as the nineteenth century there was considerable unrest, almost amounting to rebellion, in the American navy, when the Secretary of the Navy decreed that all sailors should shave their beards.

The subtle witticisms, the abundance of quotations and examples, the pleasant voice, the talent for passing on his knowledge in a simple yet carefully chiselled form, all helped make Russian history attractive to the students. His seminars kept growing larger and larger, and eventually produced over thirty doctorates in Russian history.

The particular aspect of Russian history which, I believe, has always interested Karpovich the most, and still does, is the spiritual life of the nation, the "history of ideas." At Harvard he introduced a new course on the history of Russian thought,

the Intellectual History of Russia. A "Westerner" by conviction (though Mikhail Mikhailovich himself may have some reservations about this definition) he devoted special attention in that course to the last two centuries of Russian thought: from Peter the Great, Tatishchev and Pososhkov to *Vekhi*, P. B. Struve, and the development of Russian religious and philosophical ideas during the reign of Nicholas II, when philosophy, after lying more or less dormant during the ascendancy of populist theories, again came into its own and Russian thought reached a splendid efflorescence. In the spiritual life of ancient Russia Karpovich was somewhat less interested. Soviet thought, and the whole Soviet period of Russian history, did not greatly attract his attention. In his general course on Russian history, he devoted but a few lectures to the Soviet era. By contrast, the political history of early Russia, of Kiev, Novgorod and Moscow, was always treated in detail.

The method followed by Karpovich consists in a many-sided analysis of facts, unbiased exploration, and critical and comparative evaluation of sources. In discussing a historical phenomenon, its roots and causes, he always presents his opponents' views as well as his own. All his scholarly writings and even his articles on current themes are constructed on these lines: first, an unbiased presentation of the factual material, then its discussion from all sides, and lastly his own deductions—the expression of which he is often quite willing to forego, a rare trait indeed among scholars. No doubt it is for these reasons that his book *Imperial Russia*, published in 1932, has become a very popular textbook among American students.

Humanism and tolerance, eschewal of historical determination, a genuine and deep liberalism, appreciation of the value of historically developed political forms are, together with a moderate philosophical positivism, the foundations of Karpovich's historical thinking. One may disagree with him but one can never take his argumentation and analysis lightly. It is hardly surprising that his desk should always be covered with manuscripts and books sent to him for comments and criticism by other scholars and writers, and Mikhail Mikhailovich seems to be unable to refuse anyone asking him for help. As for his



students, it is only fair to say that their interests and work have always been more important to him than his own. Even under extreme pressure of professional and private obligations, he never postponed the reading of his students' theses or articles.

The same kindliness and compassion, a distaste for hurting anyone, are evident in his scientific work and perhaps occasionally prevent him from pronouncing a sufficiently severe judgment. But then, what he himself prizes most in historical writing is the skillful collection, description, analysis, and organization of facts, rather than subjective criticism. I have recently reread his articles on Russian liberalism and its two most notable representatives in the twentieth century, P. Miliukov and V. Maklakov.<sup>2</sup> This beautifully organized study is perhaps the best example of Karpovich's method and literary style.

Both of these Russian liberals are close to Karpovich's heart. However, considering his own youthful leanings toward the left wing of Russian liberalism, he is doubtless ideologically closer to Miliukov than to Maklakov. This does not prevent him in the least from treating the two leaders with equal detachment and from throwing a rather harsh light on the unrealistic, abstract character of some of Miliukov's ideas. In the introductory part of his article, Karpovich defines his approach to the study of history, taking the case of Russian liberalism as an illustration:

Why should one pay much attention to a political trend which could not achieve any lasting results and which suffered such a crushing defeat? The answer to this question is twofold. In the first place, the historical process does not know any "ultimate" results — any "final" defeats or victories. And secondly, the importance of historical phenomena should be assessed as of the time when they occurred, and not in the light of the historian's *post factum* wisdom. Certainly, *vae victis* is not a principle for historians to follow!

Of the two types of liberalism discussed in the article, Maklakov's liberalism was, according to Karpovich, the older type, stemming from the principles and practice of Speransky, the theories of the reformers of the 1860's, and, to a certain extent,

<sup>2</sup>M. Karpovich, "Two Types of Russian Liberalism: Maklakov and Miliukov," in the symposium *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, ed. by E. J. Simmons, Harvard University Press, 1955.

from those of the Slavophiles. The aim of Maklakov's group was to *improve* the existing political and social order by reshaping it on the principles of liberty, law and justice. Maklakov's political and civic ideals had been formed early in life. From the beginning of his career, he considered the worst misfortune of Russia to be the absence of strict concepts of legality and the lack of adequate protection of the individual from arbitrary actions of the authorities. Maklakov wanted a harmonious synthesis of the rights of the citizen and the rights of the state. The Russian monarchy had, in his eyes, the great advantage of being familiar to the people, who obeyed it out of habit, as it were. A revolution would destroy the inertia of obedience and with it the legal continuity essential for the normal growth of the nation. The results of the revolution were easy to foresee: the new government would be either too weak to command obedience or would degenerate into dictatorship. It was the role of the liberals to preserve legal authority, not to destroy it. These views naturally led Maklakov to seek alliance with the moderate conservatives and resist a rapprochement between the Cadets and the radical parties of the Left.

Miliukov, on the other hand, Karpovich points out, stood for a quite different trend. He believed that in their struggle for democracy the Cadets could not compromise with the Right. If there was a certain dividing line between the Cadets and the Left, it was entirely different from the line dividing them from the Right. To the left were allies, to the right, foes. Moreover, as Karpovich says, Miliukov believed that "A politician cannot allow himself the luxury of such an indifferent and 'objective' attitude toward 'the contents of truth'"—as was taken by Maklakov who was a lawyer. (The ironical quotation marks are Miliukov's.) A politician's approach to political truth should never be anything but political. He held that the Cadets belonged in the left wing, not the center, of Russian politics, and remarked with pride that their program was more radical than the program of any other liberal party in Europe. While Maklakov saw the gravest danger to Russia in revolutionary anarchy, Miliukov believed that nothing could be worse for Russia than a victory of the forces of reaction.

After a careful portrayal of these two leaders of Russian liberalism and a completely unbiased study of their respective philosophies and positions, Karpovich notes that, as the Duma regime gained in stability, circumstances, to some extent, removed the differences between them.

With characteristic modesty, Karpovich says, toward the end of his article, "It is not the purpose of this paper to pass judgment on the respective merits of the two political approaches I have tried to outline on the preceding pages." The author has supplied the pertinent data, and the judgment is left to the reader.

I should like to close this article with Karpovich's own words, in which he sets forth very clearly his attitude toward the Russian events of the present century and in particular toward the Revolution. The following quotation from his book *Imperial Russia* is also characteristic of his understanding of history in general.

Imperial Russia is now a thing of the past. An historian should attempt to view it in its entirety and to approach it with necessary detachment. Its record is not one of unmitigated evil; it has to its credit many outstanding positive achievements. Moreover, at the time of its fall it was by no means beyond the hope of regeneration. During the period which forms the subject of this study the Russian imperial regime did not remain unchanged but on the contrary the country was undergoing a process of constant modification. Reforms usually came too late and, as a rule, were followed by periods of reaction, but on the whole it was forward movement, not a retrogression. On the eve of the World War Russia was profoundly different from what she had been in the beginning of the nineteenth century. In spite of the deadweight of the past and the acute contradictions of the present, it was a steadily and rapidly progressing country. In view of this progress it would be hardly correct to assert that the revolution was absolutely inevitable. Russia still had to solve many complicated and difficult problems but the possibility of their solution was by no means excluded. To the extent that the country was growing economically more prosperous and culturally more advanced, this possibility was constantly gaining strength and the danger of a violent upheaval was becoming more remote.

To this hope of peaceful evolution the war dealt a staggering blow. It caught Russia in the very process of radical internal reorganization. The constitutional experiment was less than a decade old; the agrarian legislation of Stolypin had been in operation for

a few years only; the scheme of universal education was just beginning to be realized; the industrial development, rapid as it was, had not yet passed beyond its early stages. Under such conditions the war was bound to produce grave disturbances in the internal life of the country. A heroic and concerted effort on the part of the whole nation was needed if the imperial structure was to weather the storm. To such an indispensable effort, the political crisis of 1915-1917 was an insurmountable obstacle. The war made the revolution highly probable, but human folly made it inevitable.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>M. Karpovich. *Imperial Russia, 1801-1917*, N.Y., Henry Holt & Co., 1932, pp. 93-95.

# Seven Poems

By BORIS PASTERNAK

Translated from the Russian

By EUGENE M. KAYDEN

TO ANNA AKHMATOVA

It seems I'm choosing the essential words  
That I can liken to your pristine power.  
And if I err, it's all the same to me,  
For I shall cling to all my errors still.

I hear the constant patter on wet roofs,  
The smothered eclogue of the wooden pavements.  
A certain city comes clear in every line,  
And springs to life in every syllable.

The roads are blocked, despite the tide of spring  
All round. Your clients are a stingy, cruel lot.  
Your eyes are moist from sewing beside a lamp,  
Where sunrise finds you bent above your work.

You long for the boundless space of Ládoga,  
And hasten, weary, to the lake for change  
And rest. It's little in the end you gain.  
The canals smell rank like musty closet-chests.

And like an empty nut the hot wind frets  
Across their waves, across the blinking eyelids  
Of stars and branches, posts and lamps, and one  
Lone seamstress gazing far above the bridge.

I know that eyes and objects vary greatly  
In sharpness, singleness, yet the mortar  
Of awesome fortitude is the open sky  
At night beneath the gaze of polar light.



That's how I call to mind your face and glance.  
 No, not the image of that pillar of salt  
 Exalts me now, in which five years ago  
 You set in rhymes our fear of looking back.<sup>1</sup>

But as it springs in all your early work,  
 Where crumbs of unremitting prose grew strong,  
 Your lines, like wires conducting sparks, in all  
 Today's affairs throb strong with what is past.

1928

<sup>1</sup>The reference is to Akhmatova's poem entitled "Lot's Wife" — the woman who paid with her life for taking one glance back upon the city which was her home.

## TO MARINA TSVETAIEVA

You're right to turn your pockets out  
 And say: "Well, rummage, feel, and search."  
 All's one to me why mists are damp.  
 Any fact would do—a day in March.

The trees in their soft overcoats  
 Stand planted in gamboge, secure,  
 Although for certainty the branches  
 Their wrappings hardly can endure.

The branches shiver with the dews  
 Rippling like fleece upon merinos;  
 The dews run shuddering like hedge hogs  
 Bearing dry haycocks on their noses.

All's one to me whose talk and chatter  
 The winds from nowhere, blowing, bring,  
 What rumors muffled in the mists  
 I hear in every backyard spring.

All's one to me what kind of suits  
 The fashion holds to be in style.  
 The hearsays boxing in the poet  
 Like dreams will vanish in a while.

While rolling on through many channels,  
By every fateful turn and bend  
He'll drift like smoke from pit to pit  
To yet another threatening dead-end.

But, steaming, he will rise through clefts  
On top, though flattened in the heat,  
And in the future men will say:  
"His age was burning up like peat."

1928

## O GREAT MARKSMAN

O great marksman, O vigilant hunter,  
Phantom with a gun on the spirit's flood!  
Spare me—one in a hundred—spare from  
Crushing in lust my life for your food.

Let me surmount a shameful death.  
Hide me at night in willow and ice.  
Start me at dawn from a lakeside brake.  
Kill on the wing! But kill in a trice!

My thanks to you, O peoples disdained,  
At our parting in my splendid flight!  
I embrace in shyness friend and neighbor,  
My country and kin in the hour of night.

1923

## COCKS

All night the water labored without a stop.  
Till dawn the rain has burned its linseed oil.  
The earth smokes like a pot of cabbage soup,  
And dense the steam beneath the lilac top.

But when the grasses, trembling, leap up again,  
Who will my terror to the dew attest  
As the first cock begins to crow and then  
Another, third, and after them the rest?

And when the cocks within the darkness call  
 Each in his turn, and probe each year by name,  
 Their crowing augurs clear of change to come  
 To rain, to earth, to love,—for all, for all.

1923

## LYUBKA\*

The rain came lately through this forest clearing  
 Like a surveyor's party. With tinsel threads  
 Now heavier the lily of the valley's leaves,  
 And water's in the mullein's furry ears.

These nurslings of the frosty firs, pull down  
 Their ear lobes with the early evening dew;  
 They shun the day, prefer to grow apart,  
 And even waft their fragrance one by one.

And when at evening tea, in summer homes,  
 The mosquito's sails fill out with mist, and night,  
 Plucking by chance the strings of a guitar,  
 Stands among the pansies in milky darkness,

The world grows scented with evening violets:  
 The years and faces come to mind. And thoughts.  
 Each event that may be rescued from the past,  
 Bestowed in the future by the hands of fate.

1927

\**Lyubka* is a popular name for an uncommonly fragrant "night violet." Actually it is of the orchid species, *orchis moris*, popularly known as "dreamlik" or dreamy one.

## I WOULD GO HOME AGAIN

I would go home again—to rooms  
 With sadness large at eventide,  
 Go in, take off my overcoat,  
 And in the light of streets outside

Find cheer. I'll pass the thin partitions  
 Right through, yes, like a beam I'll pass,  
 As image blends into an image,  
 As one mass splits another mass.

Let all abiding mooted problems  
Deep rooted in our fortunes seem  
To some a sedentary habit;  
Still even so I brood and dream.

Again the trees and houses breathe  
Their old refrain and fragrant air.  
Again to right and left old winter  
Sets up her household everywhere.

Again by dinner time the dark  
Comes suddenly—to blind, to scare,  
To teach the narrow lanes and alleys  
She'll fool them if they don't take care.

Again the skies seize unawares  
The earth; again the whirlwinds blow  
And wrap the last few dozen aspens  
Deep in a cloak of drifting snow.

Again, though weak my heart, O Moscow,  
I listen, and in words compose  
The way you smoke, the way you grope,  
The way your great construction goes.

And so I take you as my harness  
For the sake of raging days to be,  
That you may learn my verse by rote  
And for my truth remember me.

#### WHEN I GROW WEARY

When I grow weary of their empty chatter  
And turncoat flattery, my longing cries  
For memories, my sunlight dreams,—my life,  
That I might gaze into its face again.

In ways unknown, and by its will alone,  
I had the sense of exalted enterprise:  
Not by my own desire or special gift  
Or choice, but by my faith and ecstasy.

Then came the time of our constructive plans;  
Winter again, the fourth year in its turn.  
Two women, seared, in light of table lamps,  
Like ghost-fires with their burdens gleam and burn.

We live in days to come, I tell them firmly,  
And share one lot in common now. If crippled,  
No matter! Stay. We are overtaken by  
The 'New Man' in the wagon of his 'Plan.'

And if from death no medicine will save us,  
Then time, uncurbed, will rush more free into  
The far unknown where the second Five-Year Plan  
May long defer the thesis of man's soul.

O do not trouble then, and do not grieve!  
Despite my helpless state, I swear, I'll stay  
With you that day. The strong in hope endure,  
Through all the plagues that bring them low in life.

1932



## Book Reviews

LEONTOVITSCH, VICTOR. *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland*. Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1957. 426 pp. DM 34.

FISCHER, GEORGE. *Russian Liberalism*. Harvard University Press, 1958. 240 pp. \$4.50.

Messrs. Leontovitsch (University of Frankfurt) and Fischer (Brandeis University) are brave men. They have tackled a large and important, yet much neglected subject. The more timid among us should — and do — gratefully welcome their explorations into Russian liberalism.

In spite of similarity in title and an avowedly common intent, the two books differ so much that it is rather difficult to speak of them together. In a detailed and searching study Leontovitsch presents three facets of some basic *concepts* of Russian liberalism. In a stimulating and vividly written essay, Fischer sketches the social and ideological evolution of Russian liberals. While Mr. Leontovitsch restricts himself exclusively to the Russian scene, Mr. Fischer uses Russian liberalism as an example of the development of liberalism in all underdeveloped countries.

Adopting the precise juridical definition of Maurice Hauriou, Professor Leontovitsch believes that liberalism upholds the security of the individual and private property, a security that is to be achieved through a gradual evolution in conformity with historical and legal

traditions. Useful as an analytical tool, Hauriou's *ex post facto* definition raises a serious methodical difficulty when applied to the study of the *history* of political ideas or attitudes. After all, the same basic idea may have a "conservative," "liberal," or "radical" meaning depending on the specific historical context. In the first part of his study (*History of Liberalism 1762-1855*), however, Leontovitsch almost completely disregards historical context in tracing his definition of liberalism. He considers only those aspects of the individual's thinking or those implications of a legislative act which illustrate the concept he is interested in. For an historian it is difficult to accept the arbitrary isolation of selected facets of the thought of Catherine II, Speransky, Karamzin, Mordvinov, Kiselev, and Nicholas I as a satisfactory way of showing the development of liberal ideas in Russia.

What has been a source of weakness in the first part, becomes an asset in the second (*Development of Civil Liberty 1856-1914*). Here the author gives a very stimulating and valuable analysis of the legislation affecting land tenure between 1861 and 1911. He points out that the juridical consciousness of the peasant, fashioned by communal traditions and centuries of serfdom, was not yet ripe for the acceptance of individual property rights. Instead of extending the legislation of 1861 and actively sponsoring the development of individual property rights, as Stoly-

pin was to do eventually, both government and public opinion bowed to peasant prejudice; and the peasant did not attain legal equality and full civic rights until it was too late. As a result, liberalism was deprived of a most essential institutional and economic foundation. All students of pre-revolutionary Russia should carefully study this problem, as it does a great deal to illuminate the political implications of the agrarian and social crisis and demonstrates convincingly the dynamic role of juridical notions and legal institutions in the social and cultural developments of a nation. It is a great pity that Mr. Fischer has by-passed this aspect in his analysis of the liberal gentry leaders (ch. 1). It would have added depth and perspective to his somewhat sketchy picture.

In the third part of the book (*Development of Political Freedom 1856-1914*), Leontovitch describes the struggle and the failure to preserve and extend the role of the zemstvos. After the regime of Alexander III had reduced the role and autonomy of the zemstvos, the zemstvo leaders came to confuse constitution and administrative decentralization; and they failed to achieve the latter because they tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain the former. The book ends with the description of the establishment of the Constitution of 1906 and the first Duma. This section offers little that is new. Leontovitch's main source — as well as his greatest hero — is V. A. Maklakov. It is a pity that Mr. Leontovitch did not make more use of the Duma reports, the accounts of government institutions, and memoirs of other participants. He might have seen

that the constitutional experiment failed for reasons other than Miliukov's clinging to radical mythology or the zemstvo leaders' preference for politics.

For his part, analyzing the political evolution of Russian liberalism on the eve of 1905, Professor Fischer takes almost the opposite viewpoint. In tracing the social and ideological movement which culminated in the formation of the Cadet party in 1905, Fischer is interested not so much in legal concepts or abstract notions, as in the personal and sociological aspects of political ideology and organization. Avoiding a rigid definition of liberalism, he focuses his attention on the pragmatic expressions of broadly liberal viewpoints and attitudes among the gentry, the professions, and the intelligentsia. As a political attitude, liberalism emerged among the gentry whose leaders had to solve the concrete, limited problems arising out of the Emancipation and zemstvo legislation. This sound view would have been of greater value yet, had Mr. Fischer described more fully the ideas and attitudes of the early gentry leaders, the sources of their inspiration, as well as their practical activities. As it is, important personalities like Koshelev, Chicherin, and even Petrunkevich and Shipov remain shadowy figures.

Russian liberalism changed under the influence of the country's modernization and industrialization, as well as in its reactions to the continuance of autocracy. It had begun by expressing the aspirations of the enlightened gentry, later it came to serve as a vehicle for the demands of a new intelligentsia of professional people (though it is quite incorrect to equate the pro-

professional people with the intelligentsia, as Mr. Fischer does on p. 52). "Small deeds," as limited practical reforms were contemptuously labeled in Russia (and it is ironic to find that Mr. Fischer agrees with this disparaging estimate) were abandoned in favor of a consciously active political program. Liberals broke with the regime that would not reform itself, they agitated for a constitution, and entered into a tactical alliance with the revolutionaries. To Mr. Leontovitch this means betraying liberalism in favor of a misguided radicalism; but Mr. Fischer applauds. With a keen flair for political reality, Professor Fischer concentrates his attention on personalities, and the social and intellectual forces inside the *zemstvo* and professional groups. On this, in what are the best pages of his book, he provides important and new information (ch. 4 and sections in chs. 3 and 5). He obviously enjoys analyzing the political game; he has a keen eye for the problems and issues of organization and ideology and draws a satisfying and vivid picture of the discussions, conflicts, conspiracies, and public acts that culminated in the formation of the Cadet party. We can but regret that he has not chosen to use his obvious talents to write the history of the Cadet party itself. It would have been a valuable corrective to Mr. Leontovitch's questionable and politically myopic interpretation.

But Mr. Fischer also pursues a broader aim: the history and problems of Russian liberalism serve to illustrate and explain the sociological and political nature of what he calls "have not liberalism," i.e. liberalism of underdeveloped societies. In underdeveloped countries

aiming at catching up with the industrial progress of the North Atlantic societies, argues Mr. Fischer, the active political, and ideological class is not the bourgeoisie (for which there is no solid basis), but the professional men (frequently of gentry origin). The professionals form an "intelligentsia" which draws its ideology from Western thought. The option for liberalism is made hesitatingly, and in the process of finding acceptance in an alien milieu, liberalism frequently undergoes important changes in method as well as in goal. This is a stimulating and plausible thesis. Unfortunately, in adducing the evidence, Mr. Fischer is a little too cavalier in his handling of terms and details, and his historical analogies often seem rather superficial.

After reading the two books we must admit that we still don't know exactly what "liberalism" was or meant in the Russian context. Leontovitch's juridical definition is too narrow and applies only to the end product of a liberal evolution (where it becomes almost undistinguishable from America's "new conservatism"). Mr. Fischer's pragmatic analysis fails to explain satisfactorily the intellectual character and ideological force of Russian liberalism. Mr. Leontovitch loses himself in the labyrinth of legal and legislative details, and misjudges the dynamic social and political context of attitudes and ideologies. Mr. Fischer's view of the process is too sweeping, and his sociological and analogical categories are too broad. Yet their efforts have not been in vain. Not only have they called our attention to an important problem of Russian intellectual and political history, but they have also

made available valuable material, and have presented hypotheses. For this we are grateful to them. But Russian liberalism is still awaiting its historian.

MARC RAEFF

Clark University

WOLIN, SIMON, and SLUSSER, ROBERT M., (Eds.). *The Soviet Secret Police*. New York, Praeger, 1957. 408 pp. \$8.00.

Permeating all facets of Russian life and directly controlling a great number of them, ranging from sports to atomic energy, the secret police plays a role in the Soviet state as important as it is little known. It is safe to say that no other Communist institution of comparable significance has been the subject of so much speculation and sensationalism, and of so little careful investigation. The nature of the subject has naturally encouraged dramatic coverage, while the apparent lack of reliable material has inhibited scholarly consideration. But the present volume suggests that a considerable amount of information is obtainable from well-informed persons and that western repositories contain more material for the diligent researcher than had previously been suspected. Drawing upon both of these sources, *The Soviet Secret Police* is a pioneer effort of objective analysis, a storehouse of facts and deserving of much more attention than, unfortunately, it will probably receive. The Columbia Program, the editors and authors are to be congratulated on a notable contribution to Soviet studies.

The opening essay is a survey by the editors of the history of the

secret police from 1917 to 1956. A Postscript covering developments during the next eighteen months and an Addenda based on materials subsequently discovered were added while the volume was in press. The survey has as many pages of notes, which are equally informative, as it does of text. It is unfortunate that technical problems of publication evidently prevented the better integration of all these sections which, together, contain the most complete and best documented account of the secret police available. It is to be hoped that Mr. Slusser, who is continuing his research on the subject, will be encouraged to write a further study, making use of later findings gleaned from rich but little used sources.

The Cheka was instituted as an emergency agency soon after the October Revolution and grew to become a permanent and principal part of the new order, a telling commentary on the modifications or even reversal of direction which the practice of Communism experienced in the face of realities. Originally directed against non-Party opposition, which was expected to be short-lived, it had, as early as 1923, begun to act against opposition within the Party, presaging the great purges of the Thirties. It is of interest that Stalin was the initiator of that first ominous step. Ten years later he was preparing the way for the bloodletting that was to follow after 1935. In this connection, the editors take note of evidence that the murder of Kirov may have been a clever first move to clear the way for the purge, rather than its inspiration.

Emerging as the leader of the secret police, after the purges had eliminated not only real and poten-

tial opposition to Stalin but two successive police heads as well, (Yagoda and Yezhov), L. P. Beriia rapidly gained honors and position never attained by his predecessors and fraught with danger to his colleagues. It is not surprising, therefore, that the "doctor's plot" and associated events immediately before the dictator's death point to an attempt against Beriia, or that his term as a member of the collective leadership was so quickly and violently terminated.

Of perhaps even greater import than the brutality, permanence, recurring irresponsibility and internecine character of the secret police is its ubiquity. The number of present and former members of the secret police in vital political, economic and diplomatic posts becomes particularly significant when it is understood that allegiance is not terminated by transfer to other duties. As to the extent and degree of direct secret police activity, these are ably delineated in the present work in the essays by émigrés who, for one reason or another, have personal knowledge of its operation. In the space of this review it would be impossible to discuss the myriad duties or the intricate bureaucracy described in these articles. But the evident attempt at objectivity by Messrs. E. A. Andreievich, V. P. Artemiev, G. S. Burlutsky and A. Grigoriev and their praiseworthy admission of gaps in their information inspire confidence in their accounts.

Special mention should perhaps be made of the essay by Konstantin Shteppa, who, under the name Godin, authored an earlier volume with F. Beck on the Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession. Discussing the role of Dzerzhinski

as a founder of Soviet terrorism, or Chekism, Shteppa concludes that despite certain refinements, changes of name and administrative organization, all of the salient features of the system as it has developed since can be found in the administration of its first head from 1917 to 1926.

Shteppa supports the editors in the conclusion that the secret police must be considered an integral part of the Soviet system, inextirpably bound to the Party dictatorship, which it both supports and constantly threatens. They view the apparent relaxation of police controls since Stalin's death with skepticism and, except for Mr. Wolin, seem to feel that the re-establishment of Party control over the police since the elimination of Beriia cannot be expected to continue for long. It is a sober and sobering volume.

ROBERT PAUL BROWDER

*University of Colorado*

HAMMOND, THOMAS TAYLOR. *Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution, 1893-1917*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1957. 155 pp. \$3.50.

The officially sponsored "revival" of Leninism in the Soviet Union is having, to a large extent unintentionally, its counterpart in the West, where a number of studies have lately been devoted to Lenin and Leninism. Mr. Hammond's book is another contribution to this fascinating theme.

Mr. Hammond points out at the beginning of his work that Lenin was not "an ivory-tower thinker but a man of action," dedicated to changing the social system by revolution. To him, the fundamental



historical task of the proletariat was to bring about this change which, however, could be accomplished only if the proletariat were led by a small group of devoted "ideologists," the professional revolutionaries. Only under their leadership could the proletariat be imbued with proper class consciousness, formulate its true aims, and devise correct means for attaining them. This portion explains Lenin's concept of the socialist party, his attitude towards trade unions, as well as his attacks on the "economists," "liquidators," "boycotters," and others, with whom he disagreed.

Believing that the political struggle was more important than the economic, Lenin naturally looked upon trade unions as organizations in which the politically more advanced and class conscious socialists, i.e., predominantly the Bolsheviks, should achieve positions of leadership and exercise revolutionary influence. Trade unions could not be independent or neutral bodies in relation to the revolutionary socialist party, but rather its "front" organizations. Although sometimes expressing himself in favor of reforms, Lenin never lost sight of revolution as the aim of the Social Democratic Party, and attacked "reformism" as a corrupting influence which was dangerous because it tended to divert the workers' movement from its main task — the destruction of the capitalist system. The improvements that Lenin was interested in were only those which, as he put it, would not corrupt the political consciousness of the workers, but actually "increase their ability to lead the class struggle . . ."

Some of Lenin's ideas, e.g., his insistence on the subordination of

the trade unions to the Party, not only foreshadowed the future Soviet development in this regard, but have also been generally applied by the Communists in their policies. In the early years of this century they were criticised by many socialists, including Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, and Plekhanov, who perceived their totalitarian implications. In the words of Plekhanov, written in 1904, "In the view of Lenin we see not *Marxism* but . . . a new edition of *the theory of the hero and the crowd* . . . Since he declares himself to be the only active element in history, he considers the masses as only . . . strong but obedient tools." On the other hand, some of Lenin's other ideas, especially those pertaining to tactics, are related primarily to the Russian conditions of his time and even the Communists would not now claim their general applicability.

Mr. Hammond's book, although occasionally repetitive, abounds in illuminating quotations from Lenin's works and contains a very useful bibliography. Viewed as a whole, it presents a fair treatment of its topic and may well serve as a reference as well as a stimulus to those who may wish to relate Lenin's views on trade unions, reform, and revolution between 1893 and 1917 to his later views, and to the position taken by the Soviet and other Communists since 1917.

D. NOVAK

McMaster University

HOFMANN, WERNER. *Die Arbeitsverfassung der Sowjetunion*. Berlin, Duncker & Humboldt, 1956. 544 pp., paper DM 39.60; cloth DM 43.60.

The author has supplied both the scholar and the educated layman with an informative and stimulating analysis of Soviet economic policy and Soviet labor law — in essence a plea for a more realistic appraisal of Soviet productivity and a recognition of elements contributing to stability. The author believes that the Soviet Union has achieved a workable balance between the demands of an industrial society for a regular supply of trained specialists and workers and the demands of the Communist Party for an ideologically reliable population.

Chapter I, "Soviet 'original accumulation'" (pp. 1-32) introduces a major problem faced by the Soviet Union in its first decade, the need of capital. The policy of collectivization was the solution adopted and from it resulted three major interrelated elements of the Soviet Labor Constitution which had a dominant influence on subsequent developments: (1) permanent sacrifice, (2) permanent repression and (3) the emergence of a "new hierarchically differentiated social command power." In Chapter II, "The Economics of Labor" (pp. 33-224) the author discusses the importance of the above in the industrialization of the Soviet Union and specifies policies aimed at securing an effective working population. The three remaining chapters are essentially attempts at answering three questions: 1. Can Soviet labor law be equated with permanent repression (Chapter III, "The Disciplining of Labor Forces"

pp. 225-304)? Specifically agreeing with Professor H. J. Berman on an issue which has been hotly debated in the United States, the author stresses the educative function of Soviet law and rejects the view that mere repression is involved. 2. Does Soviet economic policy result in permanent sacrifice (Chapter IV, "Commercial Accounting at the Place of Work" pp. 305-475)? The author finds that Soviet policy aims at greater production by using commercial accounting methods to balance individual self-interest and an hypothesized general interest of society. In a word, he who produces is not subject to permanent sacrifice. 3. How far has the "new hierarchically differentiated social command power" developed (Chapter V, "The Question of an Industrial Elite" pp. 477-528)? The author concludes that a managerial elite has indeed emerged when viewed in terms of economic privilege, but that it lacks the capacity for effective independent action. The above summary hardly does justice to a work full of information and analysis. Indeed the last four chapters might well stand as independent studies.

As a synthesis of the works of other scholars this book has no parallel, particularly because it treats so many interrelated issues. Although there is clear evidence of original research, many of the issues are more thoroughly treated in monographs cited. The author has used an enormous amount of material; his recognition of the importance of American monographs being especially noteworthy. The book is well organized and is written in a complex but clear style. It is accompanied by a good index.

The author's scholarly presenta-

tion is convincing, but its effect is sometimes marred by his apparent belief that from economic history, especially of the West, rules of economic development may be extracted by which the Soviet Union may be judged. That belief is reflected, for example, in his comment that compulsory labor is an anachronism (p. 275). A check of a small part of his citations reveals an instance of carelessness. On p. 372 he cites A. Bergson, *The Structure of Soviet Wages*, 1946, as his authority for distinguishing four stages in Soviet wage policy. Hofmann uses 1921 rather than Bergson's 1920 as the year dividing stages one and two. More significantly Hofmann attributes to Bergson the conclusion that in the period from 1931 to the sixth Five-Year Plan the Soviet Union followed a policy of differentiation of wages. In fact Bergson's book does not go beyond 1938. In a later work which Hofmann does not cite, A. Bergson and H. Heymann, Jr., *Soviet National Income and Product 1940-48*, 1954, the Soviet government is found to have followed during World War II a policy which tended in part toward the equalization of wages. The mere citation of laws may lead to unresolved contradictions. Article 135 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR which imposes penalties on those interfering with the work of trade unions is cited (p. 265) in support of the view that the managerial class is criminally liable to the government. Yet the implication that the work of the trade unions is important is contradicted by earlier remarks by the author (p. 235). How liable can the managerial class be?

A stimulating book makes the reader greedy for more. Perhaps,

therefore, the reviewer is inclined to object unfairly to the author's scanty treatment of the interrelation of labor policy and ideological or nationalist goals. For example, he discusses population policy as a purely economic measure (pp. 73-77). From a strictly economic orientation one might object to his not having dealt in Chapter IV with the very thorny problem of government subsidies and their role in wage policy. A full discussion of the implementation of Soviet labor law in Chapter III, i.e. more clues to the functioning of the Soviet judiciary would have been desirable.

This book is a welcome contribution to the fields of Soviet law and economics. It should produce further debate over several questions. For example, to what extent is Soviet law educative? Can economic decisions be made on ideological rather than on practical grounds? Timely is the author's judgment of an important factor in creating and extending an effective labor force—the Soviet educational system. "In spite of its limited and purely technical and economic orientation, the 'cultural revolution' in the Soviet Union is one of the great successes of Bolshevism (p. 188)."

OSWALD P. BACKUS III  
University of Kansas

CATTELL, DAVID T. *Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1957. 304 pp. Cloth, \$3.00; paper, \$2.00.

It is more than twenty years since General Francisco Franco set out from Spanish Morocco with his Moorish Legions in order to destroy the Republic to the north. The

clash, which took nearly one million lives in three murderous years, began as a civil war but was soon transformed into a battleground for the Great Powers. The struggle, in fact, became so much of an international affair that purely Spanish-fought battles seemed only a side-show.

It is in this light that David T. Cattell's monograph, *Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War*, should be read, particularly because the events of those years have become intellectually cloudier and more ideologically emotional in the intervening time. His explicit purpose was to explore the U.S.S.R.'s attempt "to explore the doctrine of 'collective security' as a means to her own defense" and to study her endeavor "to use the Spanish crisis to strengthen her relations with England and France and to defend herself against German aggression." His findings seem to be entirely justified if they are divorced from the party, military and secret police levels.

The attempt to develop a working rapprochement with London and Paris over Spain was never an easy task for Soviet foreign policy. The Tories frequently favored the rebels and France was compelled to tag along. By the autumn of 1938 English and French appeasement on the continent and within the councils of the hapless Non-Intervention Committee had reached its peak. "England and France," says Mr. Cattell, "had in fact much earlier abandoned any idea of supporting legitimacy or democracy in Spain, but merely hoped to keep Fascist and Nazi influence at a minimum." On February 27, 1939 the Allied governments granted Franco *de jure* recognition. Thirty

days later the last hopeless battle was fought.

In retrospect, the Soviet Union acquitted themselves handsomely both diplomatically and in the impact of their propaganda. Stalin, of course, never had any interest in the fate of Spanish Democracy or the thousands of passionate and frequently sincere volunteers who died in his name. In the early stages of the war the Soviets were not even interested in fomenting a Communist insurrection within the ranks. Their goal was to defend Russian national interests against Hitler by seeking to adjust Europe's military and political scales. Failing in this, they cynically turned on the Republicans and non-Communists and eventually even made off with the Spanish gold reserve. The loyalists, meanwhile, could wither and die.

It was at approximately this point that the Soviet Union, having given up on England and France and Spain, turned to Germany. "The Soviet Union," concludes Mr. Cattell, "the least powerful of the three, feared isolation above all. Consequently, when she was unable to ally with the movement she considered less dangerous to herself and her survival, she turned to the other."

A set of exhaustive notes add to the value of this thorough and objective study. Perhaps it will help make the Soviet position clearer.

MURRAY POLNER

Brooklyn College

LEONHARD, WOLFGANG. *Child of the Revolution*. Trans. by C. M. Woodhouse, Chicago, Henry Regnery. 447 pp. \$6.50.

This is the story of a man who was trained as a priest in the Communist Church but who later fell prey to heresy. It provides a better picture of the inner working of the international Communist machine than any other book available.

Wolfgang Leonhard was brought up as a Communist, first in Germany and then in Soviet Russia. During the war he was selected from young Germans in Russia for special training at the Comintern school, which was to make him a pillar of Soviet control in Eastern Germany after the war.

The school bore closer relation to a theological seminary of the most rigorous kind than to a center for political training. Leonhard's account of his life there is the most important part of his book because it throws light on the methods used by the Russians to produce officials and agents utterly loyal to Moscow, whatever their nationality. They are the "150 per cent Communists" — the high priests of international Communism.

These highly trained and conditioned men form the army of officials — the "apparat" — upon whom Communism depends for its strength both in Russia and abroad. It is a mistake to believe that their loyalty to Moscow derives purely from the material benefits they receive by virtue of their positions. They are won over rather by the promise, and the reality, of political power, by the exercise of political privilege and by the sense of being part of a vast movement that is going to conquer the world.

Generally these appeals prove effective; the number of high Soviet or Comintern officials deserting to the West is negligible. But Wolfgang Leonhard had not entirely lost his critical faculties by the time he was despatched to Berlin to help establish the East German puppet regime.

Then his devotion to Moscow's cause was further shaken by the treatment meted out to Tito in 1948. His doubts began to arouse suspicion among his superiors and in 1949 he fled from Germany to Yugoslavia. He is now doing research work at Oxford University.

Leonhard writes of 10 years ago, but what he says is of great value for understanding the Soviet system today. For there can be little doubt that, whatever changes have taken place since Stalin, the training of the leaders of the brave new world goes on apace.

GABRIEL GERSH

New York City

SPULBER, NICOLAS. *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe*. The Technology Press of MIT and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1957. 525 pp. \$12.50.

The vacillating policy of Tito in Yugoslavia and especially the uprisings in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 have increased interest in the economics of the Eastern European Soviet satellites. Dr. Spulber's book is a response to this interest. It is the result of many years of research and, according to Professor Max F. Millikan in his *Forward*, the book "is more than a handbook of factual information on which others could reliably depend in making their own evaluation."



The work consists of four sections. Section I gives data on natural and human resources of pre-war Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria as well as on the displacements brought about in these countries by the war and the post-war events. Section II describes the nationalization and the reorganization of their industry, banking, finance, trade, and agriculture, especially the collectivization of the latter. It is, however, incomprehensible why the author did not use the publication of the Food Research Institute at Stanford University — *The Agricultural Economy of the Danubian Countries, 1935-45*, by S. D. Zagoroff, Jenő Végh, and Alexander D. Bilimovich, Stanford, 1955, which contains many factual data on agriculture and food supply in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The author's data on collective farms show some divergences from the data of the above volume as well as the figures quoted by Pauline McD. Michael in her paper on "Collectivization Along the Danube," *Foreign Agriculture*, U.S. Department of Agriculture, October, 1951.

Section III is dedicated to planning and the fulfillment of the plans, to industrialization, manpower, and management. The last chapter of this section describes the mechanism of the intra-East-European trade, the key position of the Soviet Union in the socialist "Second world market," and the foreign trade of the Eastern European countries. Section IV contains some concluding remarks and tables with data about the national income investment.

The author gives a detailed picture of Soviet plundering of East-

ern European countries after the war and of their exploitation by the Soviet and the joint-stock companies and the extensive exports to the Soviet Union. He explains the rapid pace of nationalization in this area by an "internal dynamics of nationalization" or by "the fact that these countries did not pass through periods of war, Communism, and blockade." But he makes no reference to the many pressures of the Soviet power, nor does he ever speak of the "liberation" of these countries.

About the planned economy in Communist Eastern Europe the author writes: "the experience of these six countries shows that centralized planning with all its controls cannot actually 'push' the economy to the exact position scheduled, even when the results are officially proclaimed as 'overfulfilled.'" Moreover: "There have been complaints in all countries about the poor quality of the basic materials and constant recrimination against increased waste of social property, widespread theft, and depletion of resources. Innumerable decrees have imposed severe sentences for such 'offenses,' but they have continued to grow and multiply." As a result, "all the countries have failed to meet the targets set by their plans, and in most cases there have been substantial discrepancies between targets and achievements." On the last pages of his book the author recognizes "the deterioration of the standard of living, notwithstanding the growth achieved in total product." For in Poland, according to him, a commission of the Communist Party established in 1956 that "a considerable number of working people did not improve their situa-

tion in comparison with 1949 and also that [there] are groups of working people whose situation somewhat worsened."

In spite of these statements, nowhere in the book does one find even a hint that such exploitation cannot continue *ad infinitum*. Instead, the author merely states: "it is already apparent, however, that the economic growth of the area for the next five to ten years can be secured only at substantially lower rates than those claimed to have been achieved during the first planned quinquennium."

ALEXANDER D. BILIMOVICH  
Monterey, California

MAGARSHACK, DAVID. *Gogol*. London, Faber. 1957. 329 pp. \$6.50.

The concluding sentence of the statement on the jacket says: "But perhaps the most important feature of this biography is that it gives the English-speaking world its first real opportunity of understanding what Gogol really means to the Russians themselves." One wishes this optimistic statement were true; if it were, that would eliminate much of the difficulty (or, at least, effort) for the teachers of Russian literature of bringing the importance of Gogol to English and American audiences and classes. But while failing to accomplish this nearly impossible task (at least, for a single volume), this book has a definite value in making Gogol's life and, partly, his work a little more intelligible to the English-language reader.

The scant and totally inadequate literature on the subject available in the English language makes the appearance of the present volume

a welcome event. It represents the first serious attempt in English to present Gogol's personality and give an objective, though limited, appraisal of his work. This circumstance gains a particular point when one considers that there are many studies, both critical and biographical, available in Russian. For making Gogol a little less of a stranger to the English and American reading public Mr. Magarshack deserves a vote of thanks on the part of everyone, particularly those who make the presentation and interpretation of Russian literature to English-speaking people their life-work.

However, it would be unfair both to the public and to the author of this biography himself not to mention certain blemishes of this work. It can be said as a general statement that Mr. Magarshack repeatedly engages in gratuitous and debatable pronouncements which may lack proof in the present book, cannot be proved at all, or are easily disproved. For example, in his "Introduction," on p. 14, he says: "Russian critics have always laid great stress on the 'denunciatory' character of Gogol's writings. Gogol himself is more often than not regarded as the not altogether willing founder of a school of writers whose chief aim was to expose the vices and abuses of the autocratic regime of the Tsars." As a matter of fact, this view of Gogol happens to be an accurate one, whether he himself was "willing" or "unwilling" to share it. Incidentally, he could not have been even an unwilling "founder" of this school because the "school" or, more accurately, "the Gogol trend" was formulated and labeled *after* Gogol's death. The statement—quite

correct in itself—that Gogol was exposing the vices and abuses of the autocratic regime of the Tsars needs perhaps a little clarification. It is precisely because he was exposing the abuses that he should be considered a reformist and not a radical writer. Gogol exposed *abuses* of the regime but not the regime itself, and therefore he remained in the ranks of the opposition “of his majesty” and not “to his majesty.” With that designation Gogol himself—the Gogol of *Inspector-General* and *Dead Souls*—would have found no fault.

Another questionable point is contained in the same “Introduction” on p. 16 where Magarshack states that Gogol’s work had a “direct impact on the ‘uneducated man.’” This is more than debatable. Russian masses, the “uneducated” people, were either semi-literate or totally illiterate; on the other hand, Gogol’s language is the language of an educated person. There could be no “direct impact.”

Further unwarranted generalizations can be found on p. 20: “. . . his mother was mainly responsible for his becoming a capricious egoist . . .,” and, again, on pp. 20-21: “These ‘lofty thoughts,’ aroused in him by his primitive fear of the devil and hell-fire, were, fourteen years later, to be the cause of the greatest literary failure of his career, and were eventually to bring about his utter ruin.” One may think in this fashion, but to state it as an objective fact is somewhat presumptuous. This same attitude, it may be noted, of forcing upon the reader *as a fact* something which is only, at best, a *conjecture*, is evident in Magarshack’s discussion of Gogol’s sexual nature and experiences.

Those unwarranted assumptions are sometimes balanced by the other extreme, that of relying too much on Gogol’s own words. It is a matter of common knowledge that some of Gogol’s own statements, contained in his letters, are less than reliable.

We shall point out now some “rough spots” *sherohovatosti* of obviously translated material. In his letter home, the young Gogol writes, in Magarshack’s translation: “I badly need a teacher of mathematics.” Gogol already had a mathematics teacher at his school. What he needed was a *tutor* who could give him extra training, and help with homework. On p. 30, “inviolability of personality” is erroneously substituted for the much more logical “inviolability of person” — i.e. physical inviolability which is meant by the Russian expression *neprikosnovennost lichnosti*. On p. 49, *obstoyatelnoye opisaniye*, despite the superficial plausibility, is not “‘circumstantial’ description” (whatever that means) but “thorough” or “detailed” description.

On p. 102, *chitat lektsii* means “to lecture” (with or without notes), not “to read lectures,” despite the literal fidelity to the original.

On p. 120, there is a double error. First, the word *shishka*—a bump or a lump—is translated as “a boil,” and then “boil” is quite gratuitously changed into “trouble.” This series of erroneous interpretations inevitably leads to a most inaccurate rendition of the whole passage from *Notes of a Madman*. Unfortunately, these few examples of faulty translation constitute only a modest sample of the whole.

There is also a puzzling fact which needs explanation. On p. 241, a portrait of Gogol is shown, dated

March 5, 1852, presumably the date of the sitting. On p. 305, there is a photo of Gogol's tombstone with the inscription "died February 21, 1852." There is no doubt that both dates are in the same (old Russian) calendar.

JACK A. POSIN

Stanford University

SEDURO, VLADIMIR. *Dostoyevski in Russian Literary Criticism, 1846-1956*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1957. 412 pp. \$7.50.

The critical fate of a major author in his native land is always a rich subject for study. Such a study tells us something not only about the author but also about his critics, which is to say about the intellectual and spiritual currents that flow around the phenomenon of his life and work. Such a subject is especially lively when there is tension between an author and his native culture, and the tension between Dostoevsky and Soviet culture is certainly obvious enough.

Mr. Seduro makes clear that his study originated in a concern with criticism of Dostoevsky. From this beginning he then proceeded to trace the whole history of Dostoevsky criticism, beginning with Belinsky. But his main interest continued to be with Soviet criticism, to which the major bulk of the present volume is consequently devoted. The work is divided into Part I, Criticism before the Revolution (pp. 3-80) and Part II, Soviet Literary Criticism (pp. 83-305). Part I is subdivided into four phases of pre-Revolutionary criticism: 1) The Early "Radical" Critics, 2) Decadents, Symbolists, and Mystics, 3) The Early Marxist Critics, and 4)

Criticism on the Eve of the Revolution. Part II is subdivided into more detailed headings, with perhaps half the chapters devoted to individual critics, including Gorky, Pereverzev, Gorbachov, Lunacharsky, and others.

One motif that a work of this kind inevitably develops is that each critical school and each official Soviet policy reveals itself in the process of revealing its attitude toward Dostoevsky. Herein lies an insurmountable weakness in a study of this kind: the reader is obliged to be informed in advance about the schools and critics that pass judgment on Dostoevsky. What good are a few pages on Marxist criticism of Dostoevsky if one knows little about Marxist criticism? And obviously the author cannot be expected to stop to fill the reader in. Perhaps the practical result is that a book of this kind becomes most useful as a reference work. This use is greatly enhanced in the present study by the inclusion of full notes (nearly 40 pages) and bibliography (some 50 pages).

As the book makes clear, the fate of Dostoevsky under the Soviet regime is bound to remain inscrutable. For he suffers from the inherent ambiguity of Soviet attitudes: as a world-renowned exemplar of Great Russian genius, Dostoevsky simply cannot be long ignored or even slighted; but as the spokesman of a fervent hostility to the spiritual forces of the Revolution, Dostoevsky simply cannot be granted unqualified approval. One finally suspects that the Soviet critic would have been vastly relieved if somehow Dostoevsky could have been made to disappear.

Thus out of Mr. Seduro's work there necessarily emerges an indict-

ment not only of Soviet literary policy but also of Soviet ideology itself. Perhaps no more telling proof of the limitations of official Soviet attitudes could be offered to the reader than this carefully documented exhibit of critical misrepresentation of one of the greatest Russian literary artists.

HERBERT E. BOWMAN  
*University of Oregon*

MULLER, LUDOLF. *Das religions-philosophische System Vladimir Solovjevs*. Berlin, Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1956. 78 pp. DM 5.

Vladimir Soloviov is usually considered Russia's only *systematic* philosopher. He stands in the middle of that golden age of creative Russian religious thought which began with Dostoevsky and ended with Berdyaev. Present-day Russian theology owes to Soloviov the concept of Sophia, the Divine Wisdom and Eternal Feminine, intermediary between Creator and creation. On the other hand, some of his aesthetic disciples like the romantic symbolists Andrei Belyi and Alexander Blok became for a while glorifiers of early Soviet millennium.

There already exists considerable literature on Soloviov's thought. Prominent Russian and Western thinkers, like Shestov, Mochulsky, Ernst Benz and others have written on the subject. Nevertheless, Dr. Müller has undertaken an attempt to describe the religious system of Vladimir Soloviov's philosophy in this slender volume. For this purpose he assumes that in the

various stages of Soloviov's development his philosophy of religion was hardly changed. This assumption leads him to strange combinations of merging quotations from both the theocratic and the anti-theocratic, apocalyptic stages of Soloviov's religious evolution. The result is the more bizarre as the author has expressed preference for a biographical as opposed to a systematic treatment of Russia's history of ideas. Nor does he even attempt to specify Soloviov's place in the context of nineteenth century Russian and Western religious thought. In a one-page chapter he deals with Soloviov's views on the nature of religion, in another one-page chapter with "life out of faith as realization of religion." Dr. Müller uses the simple method of compiling paraphrase after paraphrase and even a number of literary quotations from the Russian philosopher. As bibliographical references he cites not the Russian original headings but German translations of Russian titles of Soloviov's essays.

The book shows that its author knows a considerable amount of Russian and has learned much about Soloviov. However, one is left with the impression that his main strength lies in translations—he is now participating in a German translation of Soloviov's works. For this he ought to receive credit. If, however, Dr. Müller does not show the sensitivity and creative empathy of an older generation of German Slavists, the fault is certainly not his but that of his generation's experience on Russia's battle fields.

EMANUEL SARKISYANZ  
*Freiburg University*



# Index to Volume 17

(JANUARY TO OCTOBER 1958)

(Reviews are entered under the author of the book and under reviewer)

	No.	Page
Alexandrov, Victor: <i>Khrushchev of the Ukraine</i> . Rev. by Joseph C. Roucek .....	1	72
Anderson, Paul B.: <i>The Tolstoy Foundation</i> .....	1	60
Backus, Oswald P. III: Werner Hofmann's <i>Die Arbeitsverfassung der Sowjetunion</i> .....	4	313
Barghoorn, Frederick C.: <i>Soviet Cultural Diplomacy Since Stalin</i> .....	1	41
Berliner, Joseph S.: <i>Factory Management in the U.S.S.R.</i> Rev. by Mikhail V. Condoide .....	2	145
Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets, and Articles on Russia Published in 1957. Virginia L. Close .....	3	229
Bilimovich, Alexander D.: Nicholas Spulber's <i>The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe</i> .....	4	316
Bill, Valentine Tschebotarioff: M. Karpovich and D. Cizevsky (eds.) <i>Russkii Literaturnyi Arkhiv</i> (Russian Literary Archives) .....	3	227
—(reviewer): <i>Sudby Rossii</i> , Thirteen essays by Russian scholars and journalists .....	2	156
Blok, Alexander. Trans. from "Songs of the Lady Beautiful." Robin Kemball .....	1	56
Book Notices .....	1	76
Bowman, Herbert E.: Vladimir Seduro's <i>Dostoyevski in Russian Literary Criticism 1846-1956</i> .....	4	320
—Waclaw Lednicki's <i>Bits of Table Talk on Pushkin, Mickiewicz, Goethe, Turgenev, and Sienkiewicz</i> .....	1	73
Browder, Robert Paul: Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser (eds.) <i>The Soviet Secret Police</i> .....	4	310
Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Carl J. Friedrich: <i>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</i> . Rev. by Alexander Dallin .....	2	143
Cattell, David T.: <i>Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War</i> . Rev. by Murray Polner .....	4	314
Chamberlin, William Henry: <i>Forty Years of Soviet Communism</i> .....	1	3
—Jacobin Ancestry of Soviet Communism, The .....	4	251
—John Gunther's <i>Inside Russia Today</i> .....	3	211
Cizevsky, D. and M. Karpovich, (eds.): <i>Russkii Literaturnyi Arkhiv</i> (Russian Literary Archives). Rev. by Valentine Tschebotarioff Bill .....	3	227

	No.	Page
Close, Virginia L.: Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets, and Articles on Russia Published in 1957 .....	3	229
Condoide, Mikhail V.: Joseph S. Berliner's <i>Factory Management in the U.S.S.R.</i> .....	2	145
—Elsworth Raymond's <i>Soviet Economic Progress</i> .....	2	145
Counts, George S.: <i>The Challenge of Soviet Education</i> . Rev. by N. S. Timasheff .....	1	67
Czechoslovak Legion, The (Part II). George F. Kennan .....	1	11
Dallin, Alexander: Carl J. Friedrich's and Zbigniew Brzezinski's <i>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</i> .....	2	143
Deutscher, Isaak: <i>Russia in Transition</i> . Rev. by George C. Guins .....	3	218
East Moves West: The Enigma of Vladimir Solovyov. Richard Hare .....	1	29
Eudin, X., and R. North (eds.): <i>Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt .....	1	70
—H. H. Fisher, and R. Jones (eds.): <i>Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt .....	1	70
Fischer, George (with Hugh McLean and Martin E. Malia, (eds.): <i>Russian Thought and Politics</i> . Rev. by Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. ....	2	142
— <i>Russian Liberalism</i> . Rev. by Marc Raeff .....	4	307
Fisher, H. H., X. Eudin, and R. Jones (eds.): <i>Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt .....	1	70
Fisher, Ralph T. Jr.: Hugh McLean, Martin E. Malia, and George Fischer (eds.): <i>Russian Thought and Politics</i> .....	2	142
Forty Years of Soviet Communism. William Henry Chamberlin .....	1	3
Friedrich, Carl J. and Zbigniew Brzezinski: <i>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</i> . Rev. by Alexander Dallin .....	2	143
Future of Germany and the European Settlement, The. Robert Strausz-Hupé .....	3	176
Gersh, Gabriel: Wolfgang Leonhard's <i>Child of the Revolution</i> .....	4	316
Ginsberg, Michael, and Joseph T. Shaw (eds.): <i>Indiana Slavic Studies</i> . Rev. by J. F. Matlock, Jr. ....	2	153
Graham, Hugh F.: Donald W. Treadgold's <i>The Great Siberian Migration</i> .....	1	68
Gruliov, Leo (ed.): Current Soviet Policies—II: <i>The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath</i> . Rev. by Edward C. Thaden .....	1	73
Guins, George C.: Isaak Deutscher's <i>Russia in Transition</i> .....	3	218
Gunther, John: <i>Inside Russia Today</i> . Rev. by William Henry Chamberlin .....	3	211
Hammond, Thomas Taylor: <i>Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution, 1893-1917</i> . Rev. by D. Novak .....	4	311
Hare, Richard: East Moves West: The Enigma of Vladimir Solovyov .....	1	29
Hecht, David: George Kennan's <i>Siberia and the Exile System</i> .....	3	223

	No.	Page
Hofmann, Werner: <i>Die Arbeitsverfassung der Sowjetunion</i> . Rev. by Oswald P. Backus III .....	4	313
Hopper, Bruce C.: George F. Kennan's <i>The Decision to Intervene</i> .....	3	212
Iswolsky, Helene: "The Taguil Find" or Pushkin Revisited ....	3	183
Jones, R., X. Eudin, and H. H. Fisher (eds.): <i>Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt .....	1	70
Kamenetsky, Ihor: <i>Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine</i> . Rev. by Michael M. Luther .....	3	225
Karpovich, M. and D. Cizevsky, (eds.): <i>Russkii Literaturnyi Arkhiv</i> (Russian Literary Archives). Rev. by Valentine Tschebotarioff Bill .....	3	227
Kayden, Eugene M.: (translator) "Seven Poems" by Boris Pasternak .....	4	301
Kemball, Robin: From Alexander Blok's "Songs of the Lady Beautiful" (translations) .....	1	56
Kennan, George: <i>Siberia and the Exile System</i> . Rev. by David Hecht .....	3	223
Kennan, George F.: The Czechoslovak Legion (Part II) .....	1	11
— <i>The Decision to Intervene</i> . Rev. by Bruce C. Hopper .....	3	212
Khrushchev: A Political Profile. Part I. William K. Medlin ....	4	278
Kirchner, Walther: Emanuel Sarkisyanz' <i>Russland und der Messianismus des Orients</i> .....	3	222
Konovalov, S. (ed.): <i>Oxford Slavonic Papers</i> . Rev. by Robert A. Maguire .....	2	152
Korol, Alexander G.: <i>Soviet Education for Science and Technology</i> . Rev. by S. P. Timoshenko .....	2	139
Lampert, E.: <i>Studies in Rebellion: Belinsky, Bakunin and Herzen</i> . Rev. by Martin E. Malia .....	2	146
Lednicki, Waclaw: <i>Bits of Table Talk on Pushkin, Mickiewicz, Goethe, Turgenev, and Sienkiewicz</i> . Rev. by Herbert E. Bowman .....	1	73
Letter to the Editor from Leonid I. Strakhovsky .....	1	79
Leonhard, Wolfgang: <i>Child of the Revolution</i> . Rev. by Gabriel Gersh .....	4	316
Leontovitsch, Victor: <i>Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland</i> . Rev. by Marc Raeff .....	4	307
Lord, Albert Bates (ed.): <i>Slavic Folklore: A Symposium</i> . Rev. by J. F. Matlock, Jr. ....	2	153
Luckyj, G.S.N., W. J. Rose, and L. I. Strakhovsky (eds.): <i>Canadian Slavic Papers</i> . Rev. by J. F. Matlock, Jr. ....	2	153
Lunt, H. G. (ed.): <i>Harvard Slavic Studies</i> . Rev. by Robert A. Maguire .....	2	152
Luther, Michael M.: Ihor Kamenetsky's <i>Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine</i> .....	3	225
Magarshack, David: <i>Gogol</i> . Rev. by Jack A. Posin .....	4	318
Maguire, Robert A.: S. Konovalov (ed.) <i>Oxford Slavonic Papers</i> .....	2	152

	No.	Page
—H. G. Lunt (ed.) <i>Harvard Slavic Studies</i> .....	2	152
Malia, Martin E.: E. Lampert's <i>Studies in Rebellion: Belinsky Bakunin and Herzen</i> .....	2	146
—(with Hugh McLean and George Fischer eds.): <i>Russian Thought and Politics</i> . Rev. by Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. ....	2	142
Markov, Vladimir: Gleb Struve's <i>Geschichte der Sowjetliteratur</i> .....	3	226
Matlock, J. F., Jr.: Michael Ginsburg and Joseph T. Shaw (eds.) <i>Indiana Slavic Studies</i> .....	2	153
—Albert Bates Lord (ed.) <i>Slavic Folklore: A Symposium</i> .....	2	153
—G.S.N. Luckyj, W. J. Rose, and L. I. Strakhovsky (eds.) <i>Canadian Slavic Papers</i> .....	2	153
Mayakovsky, Vladimir. Helen Muchnic .....	2	115
McLane, Charles: Peter Yershov's <i>Comedy in the Soviet Theatre</i> .....	2	155
McLean, Hugh (with Martin E. Malia and George Fischer (eds.): <i>Russian Thought and Politics</i> . Rev. by Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. ....	2	142
Medlin, William K.: Khrushchev: A Political Profile. Part I ...	4	278
Melgunov, S. P., In Commemoration of. N. Oulianoff .....	3	193
Muchnic, Helen: Vladimir Mayakovsky .....	2	115
Müller, Ludolf: <i>Das religionsphilosophische System Vladimir Solov'evs</i> . Rev. by Emanuel Sarkisyanz .....	4	321
North, R. and X. Eudin (eds.) <i>Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt .....	1	70
Novak, D.: Thomas Taylor Hammond's <i>Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution, 1893-1917</i> .....	4	311
Oulianoff, N.: In Commemoration of S. P. Melgunov .....	3	193
Pasternak, Boris: Seven Poems (translated by Eugene M. Kayden) .....	4	301
Petrov, Vladimir: <i>Radio Liberation</i> .....	2	104
Poggioli, Renato: <i>The Phoenix and the Spider. A Book of Essays About Some Russian Writers and Their View of the Self</i> . Rev. by Gleb Struve .....	2	150
Polner, Murray: David T. Cattell's <i>Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War</i> .....	4	314
Posin, Jack A.: David Magarshack's <i>Gogol</i> .....	4	318
Radio Liberation. Vladimir Petrov .....	2	104
Raeff, Marc: George Fischer's <i>Russian Liberalism</i> .....	4	307
—Michael Speransky— <i>Statesman of Imperial Russia</i> . Rev. by Leonid I. Strakhovsky .....	3	216
—Victor Leontovitsch's <i>Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland</i> .....	4	307
Raymond, Elsworth: <i>Soviet Economic Progress</i> . Rev. by Mikhail V. Condoide .....	2	145
Reformers and Radicals in Pre-World War I America. Dimitri von Mohrenschildt .....	2	128

	No.	Page
Rose, W. J., G. S. N. Luckyj, and L. I. Strakhovsky (eds.): <i>Canadian Slavic Papers</i> . Rev. by J. F. Matlock, Jr. ....	2	153
Roucek, Joseph S.: Victor Alexandrov's <i>Khrushchev of the     Ukraine</i> .....	1	72
Russia Between Byzantium and Utopia. Heinrich Stammeler ....	2	94
Russian Historian at Harvard, A. Serge A. Zenkovsky .....	4	292
Russian Intelligentsia and Bolshevism, The. Fedor Stepun ....	4	263
Russian Third State Duma, The: An Analytical Profile. C. Jay Smith, Jr. ....	3	201
Sarkisyanz, Emanuel: <i>Russland und der Messianismus des     Oriens</i> . Rev. by Walther Kirchner .....	3	222
—Ludolf Müller's <i>Das religionsphilosophische System Vladimir     Solovjevs</i> .....	4	321
Seduro, Vladimir: <i>Dostoyevski in Russian Literary Criticism     1846-1956</i> . Rev. by Herbert E. Bowman .....	4	320
Shaw, Joseph T. and Michael Ginsburg (eds.): <i>Indiana Slavic     Studies</i> . Rev. by J. F. Matlock, Jr. ....	2	153
Slusser, Robert M. and Simon Wolin, (eds.): <i>The Soviet Secret     Police</i> . Rev. by Robert Paul Browder .....	4	310
Smith, C. Jay, Jr.: <i>The Russian Third State Duma: An Ana-     lytical Profile</i> .....	3	201
Soviet Communism, The Jacobin Ancestry of. William Henry Chamberlin .....	4	251
Soviet Cultural Diplomacy Since Stalin. Frederick C. Barg- hoorn .....	1	41
Soviet System, The Durability of Despotism in the. (Part I). Bertram D. Wolfe .....	2	83
—(Part II) .....	3	163
Spulber, Nicholas: <i>The Economics of Communist Eastern Eu-     rope</i> . Rev. by Alexander D. Bilimovich .....	4	316
Stammeler, Heinrich: <i>Russia Between Byzantium and Utopia</i> ....	2	94
Stepun, Fedor: <i>The Russian Intelligentsia and Bolshevism</i> ....	4	263
Strakhovsky, L. I., G. S. N. Luckyj, and W. R. Rose (eds.): <i>Canadian Slavic Papers</i> . Rev. by J. F. Matlock, Jr. ....	2	153
—Marc Raeff's <i>Michael Speransky—Statesman of Imperial Rus-     sia</i> .....	3	216
Strausz-Hupé, Robert: <i>The Future of Germany and the Euro-     pean Settlement</i> .....	3	176
Struve, Gleb: <i>Geschichte der Sowjetliteratur</i> . Rev. by Vladimir Markov .....	3	226
—Renato Poggioli's <i>The Phoenix and the Spider. A Book of Es-     says About Some Russian Writers and Their View of the     Self</i> .....	2	150
<i>Sudby Rossii</i> , (Russia's Destiny). Thirteen essays by Russian scholars and journalists. Rev. by Valentine Tschepotarioff Bill .....	2	156
"Taguil Find, The" or Pushkin Revisited. Helene Iswolsky .....	3	183



	No.	Page
Thaden, Edward C.: Leo Gruliov (ed.) <i>Current Soviet Policies</i> —II: <i>The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist</i> <i>Party Congress and Its Aftermath</i> .....	1	73
Timasheff, N. S.: Karl H. Wittfogel's <i>Oriental Despotism: A</i> <i>Comparative Study of Total Power</i> .....	2	148
—George S. Counts' <i>The Challenge of Soviet Education</i> .....	1	67
Timoshenko, S. P.: Alexander G. Korol's <i>Soviet Education for</i> <i>Science and Technology</i> .....	2	139
Tolstoy, Alexandra: <i>Tolstoy and Music</i> .....	4	258
Tolstoy Foundation, The. Paul B. Anderson .....	1	60
Tolstoy and Music. Alexandra Tolstoy .....	4	258
Treadgold, Donald W.: <i>The Great Siberian Migration</i> . Rev. by Hugh F. Graham .....	1	68
von Mohrenschildt, Dimitri: <i>Reformers and Radicals in Pre-</i> <i>World War I America</i> .....	2	128
—X. Eudin, H. H. Fisher and R. Jones (eds.) <i>Soviet Russia</i> <i>and the West, 1920-1927</i> .....	1	70
—X. Eudin and R. North (eds.) <i>Soviet Russia and the East,</i> <i>1920-1927</i> .....	1	70
von Rauch, Georg: <i>A History of Soviet Russia</i> . Rev. by Serge A. Zenkovsky .....	3	220
Wittfogel, Karl H.: <i>Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study</i> <i>of Total Power</i> . Rev. by N. S. Timasheff .....	2	148
Wolfe, Bertram D.: <i>The Durability of Despotism in the Soviet</i> <i>System (Part I)</i> .....	2	83
—(Part II) .....	3	163
Wolin, Simon and Robert M. Slusser (eds.): <i>The Soviet Secret</i> <i>Police</i> . Rev. by Robert Paul Browder .....	4	310
Yershov, Peter: <i>Comedy in the Soviet Theatre</i> . Rev. by Charles McLane .....	2	155
Zenkovsky, Serge A.: <i>A Russian Historian at Harvard</i> .....	4	292
—Georg von Rauch's <i>A History of Soviet Russia</i> .....	3	220

# WORLD POLITICS

*A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*  
Under the Editorial Sponsorship of the  
**CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**  
**PRINCETON UNIVERSITY**

WORLD POLITICS - Vol. XI, No. 1, October 1958

## Contents

- The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing  
on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries ..... by EDWARD SHILS  
The Calculus of Deterrence ..... by MORTON A. KAPLAN  
The Conflict of Nationalism in South Africa ..... by CHARLES R. NIXON  
Workers' Self-government in Yugoslav Industry ..... by WILLIAM N. LOUCKS

## Review Articles

- Scientific International Politics ..... by C. P. KINDLEBERGER  
The Uses of Political Theory in the Grand Manner ..... by ROBERT A. DAHL  
The Study of International Administration: Retrospect and  
Prospect ..... by WALTER R. SHARP  
Communist Strategies and Asian Societies ..... by LUCIAN W. PYE  
Planning and Economic Development in India ..... by ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN  
Some Effects of Industrialization ..... by JEROME BLUM  
Pressures in a Divided France ..... by HENRY W. EHRLMANN

Subscriptions \$6.00 a year, (two years, \$10.00) single copies, \$2.00

Address: WORLD POLITICS

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, BOX 231, Princeton, N. J.

# SOVIET SURVEY

*A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends*

Edited by Walter Laqueur

The current issue of *Soviet Survey* is devoted to Eastern Europe

ULBRICHT AND THE  
INTELLECTUALS

Heinz Kerslen

LITERATURE UNDER GOMULKA

Maria Danilewicz

BULGARIAN WRITERS AND  
THEIR MENTORS

Liliana Brisby

SOCIALIST LEGALITY: SOVIET  
AND YUGOSLAV

Ivo Lapenna

CARTOONS:  
MOSCOW - WARSAW - PRAGUE

Karel Brusak

CLIO IN BUCHAREST

Daniel Norman

THE LAND TO THE PEASANT

A. Rozental

THE SILENT WRITERS OF  
HUNGARY

Vincent Savarius

Price 3s.

Annual Subscription 12s.

(U.S. & Canada \$2.00)

Order your copy now from

**SOVIET SURVEY**

25 HAYMARKET

LONDON S.W.1

ENGLAND

**Statement Required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as  
Amended by the Acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946  
(Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) Showing the  
Ownership, Management, and Circulation**

OF THE RUSSIAN REVIEW published quarterly at Hanover, N. H., additional entry  
Deep River, Conn. for October 1, 1958.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, The Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H.; Editor, Dimitri von Mohrenschildt, 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H.; Managing editor, none; Business manager, none.

2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.)

The Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H. Voluntary, non-stock corporation.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (if there are none, so state.) None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT  
Editor

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of August, 1958.

INEZ M. KELLAM, Notary Public.  
(My commission expires 31 March, 1963)

